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Abstract. This article is concerned with the role of fundamental principles in theoretical physics, especially 
quantum theory. The fundamental principles of relativity will be addressed as well, in view of their role in quantum 
electrodynamics and quantum field theory, specifically Dirac’s work, which, in particular Dirac’s derivation of his 
relativistic equation of the electron from the principles of relativity and quantum theory, is the main focus of this 
article. I shall also consider Heisenberg’s earlier work leading him to the discovery of quantum mechanics, which 
inspired Dirac’s work. I argue that Heisenberg’s and Dirac’s work was guided by their adherence to and their 
confidence in the fundamental principles of quantum theory. The final section of the article discusses the recent 
work by G. M. D’Ariano and coworkers on the principles of quantum information theory, which extend quantum 
theory and its principles in a new direction. This extension enabled them to offer a new derivation of Dirac’s 
equations from these principles alone, without using the principles of relativity.  
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I am working out a quantum theory about it for it is really 
most tantalizing state of affairs. 
 
—James Joyce, Finnegans Wake 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In his paper introducing his famous relativistic equation for the electron, Dirac commented on a 
major difficulty that his equation inherited from the Klein-Gordon equation, even though he saw 
his equation as a major advance. In particular, unlike the Klein-Gordon equation, Dirac’s 
equation enabled him to answer, for the relativistic electron, the following question, arguably the 
main question of quantum theory: “What is the probability of any dynamical variable at any 
specified time having a value laying between any specified limits, when the system is 
represented by a given wave function ψn?” Dirac clarified that the Klein-Gordon theory “can 
answer such questions if they refer to the position of the electron … but not if they refer to its 
momentum, or angular momentum, or any other dynamic variable” [1, pp. 611-612; emphasis 
added]. However, as Dirac explains, there was a major problem equally affecting both theories: 
[Either equation] refers equally well to an electron with charge e as to one with charge – e. If one considers for 
definitiveness the limiting case of large quantum numbers one would find that some of the solutions of the wave 
equation are wave packets moving in the way a particle of – e would move on the classical theory, while others 
are wave packets moving in the way a particle with charge e would move classically. For this second class of 
solutions W has a negative value. One gets over the difficulty on the classical theory by arbitrarily excluding 
those solutions that have a negative W. One cannot do this on the quantum theory, since in general a 
perturbation will cause transitions from state with W positive to states with W negative. Such a transition would 
appear experimentally as the electron suddenly changes its charge from – e to e, a phenomenon which has not 
been observed. The true relativi[stic] wave equation should thus be such that its solutions split up into two non-
combining sets, referring respectively to the charge – e and the charge e. 
 In the present paper we shall only be concerned with the removal of [the Klein-Gordon equation’s inability to 
 2!
predict the probability of all dynamical variables of the system  represented by a given wave function]. The 
resulting theory [embodied in Dirac’s equation] is therefore still only an approximation, but it appears to be 
good enough to account for all the duplexity phenomena without arbitrary assumptions. [1, p. 612] 
The difficulty does not appear in low-energy regimes or rather it disappears at the low energy 
limit, because Dirac’s equation converts into Schrödinger’s equation, where this problem does 
not arise. In commenting on the problem in his 1929 Chicago lectures, The Physical Principles 
of the Quantum Theory, published in 1930 [2], Heisenberg reprised Dirac’s assessment and even 
amplified it by saying that Dirac’s “theory is certainly wrong.” Heisenberg added an intriguing 
twist. He said: “The classical theory could eliminate this difficulty by arbitrarily excluding the 
one sign, but this is not possible to do according to the principles of quantum theory. Here 
spontaneous transitions may occur to the states of negative value of energy E; as these have 
never been observed, the theory is certainly wrong. Under these conditions it is very remarkable 
that the positive energy-levels (at least in the case of one electron) coincide with those actually 
observed” [2, p. 102; emphasis added]. As became apparent a few years later, Dirac’s theory 
proved to be better than it appeared, even to its creator, at the time of its introduction. Indeed, it 
has proven to be correct. It was our understanding of nature in high-energy quantum regimes that 
was deficient. That a perturbation may cause transitions from a state with positive E to a state 
with negative E is a common occurrence that appears experimentally as an electron 
spontaneously changing its negative charge into a positive one and becoming a positron. 
Antimatter was staring into Dirac’s eyes. It took, however, a few years to realize that it was 
antimatter and that this type of transition (eventually understood in terms of the creation and 
annihilation of particles and virtual particle formation) defines high-energy quantum regimes. 
This is one of the great stories of quantum theory. 
The main concern of this paper, however, is another facet of Heisenberg’s thinking 
transpiring here, to which I referred above as “an intriguing twist” of his assessment. This facet 
was equally found in Dirac’s thinking. While Heisenberg and Dirac had their doubts concerning 
Dirac’s theory itself, neither appears to have doubted “the principles of quantum theory,” which, 
while physical in nature, were also given a proper mathematical expression in the formalism of 
the theory. This confidence and their emphasis on the role of these principles are reflected in the 
titles of Heisenberg’s book, just cited, and Dirac’s The Principles of Quantum Mechanics, 
published around the same time, in 1930 [3]. The term “principle” requires a proper explanation 
to be offered in Section 2. Suffice it to say for the moment that, as it was understood or (they do 
not really define it) at least practiced by Heisenberg and Dirac, and as it will be understood here, 
a principle is more than only a postulate expressing a fundamental assumption concerning how 
one should understand nature, although a principle may involve such a postulate. I shall explain 
the term postulate in Section 2. A principle also serves as guidance for a chain of reasoning in 
building a physical theory, making it what A. Einstein called “a principle theory,” a concept also 
discussed in Section 2 [4]. It might have been a matter of replacing Dirac’s theory with a 
different theory, based on these principles, but not replacing these principles themselves (because 
they had demonstrated their validity and efficacy in quantum mechanics), but only refining them 
and introducing new ones in the same spirit. As it happened, Dirac’s theory has proven to be 
correct, although far from the end of the story of quantum electrodynamics and quantum field 
theory, which continue to conform to the principles in question. Heisenberg and Dirac were led 
to their momentous discoveries of, respectively, quantum mechanics and quantum 
electrodynamics by their confidence in and adherence to the fundamental principles of quantum 
theory, and by the discoveries of some of these principles, in the first place. 
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This article will consider the roles of fundamental principles and principle thinking in 
quantum theory, including thinking that leads to the invention of new such principles, which is, I 
would argue, one of the ultimate achievements of theoretical thinking in any field.1 This subject 
has been uncommon in recent discussions of quantum foundations, dominated by more formal 
(mathematical or logical) aspects of quantum theory.2 Dirac’s work, most especially his 1928 
discovery of his relativistic equation for the electron is my main example of principle thinking in 
quantum theory, although I shall also consider Heisenberg’s principle thinking, which led him to 
his discovery of quantum mechanics. This thinking inspired much of Dirac’s work, including 
that leading him to his discovery of his equation. I shall offer a few brief reflections on the role 
of fundamental principles of quantum theory in subsequent developments of quantum field 
theory, leading to the Standard Model of elementary particle physics. Particular attention, 
however, will be given to the recent work by G. M. D’Ariano and coworkers, grounded in the 
principles of quantum theory as quantum information theory [9, 10, 11]. This rethinking allows 
them to derive Dirac’s equation from the principles of quantum information alone, rather than, as 
Dirac did, from combining the principles of quantum theory and (special) relativity [11]. 
As just stated, rethinking fundamental principles is crucial to theoretical physics. W. Pauli 
stressed this point in his assessment of Einstein’s work on quantum theory: 
If new features of the phenomena of nature are discovered that are incompatible with the system of theories 
assumed at that time, the question arises, which of the known principles used in the description of nature are 
general enough and which have to be modified or abandoned. The attitude of different physicists to problems of 
this kind, which make strong demand on the intuition and tact of a scientist, depends to a large extent on the 
personal temperament of the investigator. In the case of Planck’s discovery of 1900 of the quantum of action [h] 
during the course of his famous investigations of the law of the black-body radiation, it was clear that the law of 
conservation of energy and momentum and Boltzmann’s principle connecting entropy and probability were two 
pillars sufficiently strong to stand unshaken by the development resulting from the new discovery. It was indeed 
the faithfulness to these principles which enabled Planck to introduce the new constant h, the quantum of action, 
into his statistical theory of the thermodynamic equilibrium of radiation. 
The original investigation of Planck, however, had treated with a certain discretion the question whether 
the new “quantum-hypothesis” implies the necessity of changing the laws of microscopic phenomena 
themselves independent of statistical applications, or whether one had to use only an improvement of the 
statistical methods to enumerate equally probable states. In any case, the tendency towards a compromise 
between the older ideas of physics, now called the “classical” ones, and the quantum theory was always favored 
by Planck, both in his earlier and later work on the subject, although affirmation of such a possibility was to 
diminish considerably the significance of his own discovery. 
Such considerations formed the background on Einstein’s first paper on quantum theory … , which was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Throughout this article, unless specified otherwise, by quantum theory I refer to the standard versions of quantum 
mechanics, quantum electrodynamics, and quantum field theory, especially their mathematical structures, rather than 
alternative theories of quantum phenomena, such as Bohmian theories, for example. By quantum phenomena, I refer 
to those observed physical phenomena in considering which Planck’s constant, h, must be taken into account; and by 
quantum objects, I refer to those entities in nature that, through their interactions with measuring instruments, are 
responsible for the appearance of quantum phenomena. 
2 Among exceptions are A. Zeilinger’s article [5], J. Bub’s article on quantum mechanics as a principle theory on 
Einstein’s definition [6], an earlier approach to Heisenberg’s discovery of quantum mechanics by the present author 
[7, pp. 9-16), and most recently, R. M. Ungar and L. Smolin’s book, which builds on Smolin’s earlier work [6]. The 
principles grounding Smolin’s argument are, however, not the principles of quantum theory considered in this article. 
Indeed, most of his key principles, beginning with Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, which grounds Smolin’s 
argument, are in conflict with the key principles of quantum theory advocated here. (Smolin’s argumentation is in 
conflict with some of the principles of relativity, both special and general, as well.) There is some overlap. The 
gauge-invariance principle, extensively used by Smolin, is consistent with the principles advocated here and is 
especially important in quantum field theory. Also, Smolin’s view of mathematics and its role in physics is in accord 
with the present argument and the overall (non-Platonist) philosophical stance adopted in this article. 
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preceded by his papers on the fundamental of statistical mechanics and accompanies, in the same year 1905, by 
his fundamental papers on the theory of the Brownian motion and the theory of relativity. [12, p. 86; emphasis 
added] 
Later on Einstein also reflected, in explaining the (principle) nature of relativity theory, on the 
concept of (fundamental) principles and on “principle [physical] theories,” as he called them, in 
juxtaposition to “constructive theories” [4]. Pauli does not explain what he means by principles, 
nor, as I said, do Heisenberg and Dirac in their books, their titles notwithstanding. Pauli, 
however, is right to argue that “it was indeed the faithfulness to these principles which enabled 
Planck to introduce the new constant h, the quantum of action, into his statistical theory of the 
thermodynamic equilibrium of radiation” (emphasis added). Heisenberg’s and Dirac’s great 
discoveries were equally enabled by their faithfulness to the principles of quantum theory and by 
their introduction of new such principles. 
 
2. Principle Thinking in Theoretical Physics 
 
This section explains the concept of principle, as it is to be understood in this article. While it has 
not always been expressly defined by the founding figures mentioned above, how they use the 
concept of principle could be given a cohesive sense, with which the present understanding of 
principle is consistent and from which it in part derives. Ultimately, these are this use and, in the 
first place, the invention of new principles that are most crucial, especially when it comes to the 
discovery of new theories in physics or elsewhere, a point not lost on Einstein, whose distinction 
between “constructive” and “principle” theories is my point of departure here [4].  
First, I would like to define “axioms” and “postulates,” again, as they will be used here, 
although these terms become germane to my argument only in Section 5. These terms are often 
used, in physics (mathematicians tend to be more careful), somewhat indiscriminately and 
interchangeably with each other or both with “principle,” as a result obscuring substantive points 
at stake. Admittedly, it is difficult and perhaps impossible to entirely avoid overlapping between 
the concepts designated by these terms, but it is possible to sufficiently analytically separate 
these concepts, enabling a better understanding of their functioning and roles, and I shall attempt 
to do so here. Euclid, and, it appears, the ancient Greeks in general, distinguished between the 
“axioms” and the “postulates.” Axioms were thought to be something manifestly self-evident, 
such as the first axiom of Euclid (“things equal to the same thing are also equal to each other”). 
A postulate, by contrast, is postulated, in the sense of “let us assume that … ,” thus indicating 
more that one aims to proceed under this assumption and see what follows from it according to 
established logical rules (this is the same as proceeding from axioms), rather than claiming the 
postulate to be a self-evident truth. Euclid’s postulates may be thought of as those assumptions 
that were necessary and sufficient to derive the truths of geometry, of some of which we might 
already be intuitively persuaded (e.g., “the first postulate: to draw a straight line from any point 
to any point”). The famous Fifth Postulate is a case in point. It defines Euclidean (flat) geometry 
alone, which also explains millennia of attempts to derive it as a theorem. In Kant’s 
understanding of geometry, inspired by Euclid, axioms are analytic and postulates synthetic 
propositions. Keeping in mind further complexities potentially involved in geometry and beyond, 
I shall adopt this understanding of axioms and postulates. Given that my subject is physics rather 
than mathematics, I shall refer primarily to postulates, assumed on the basis of experimental 
evidence (as it stands now and hence potentially refutable) and often, but not always, grounding 
principles. In fact, it is not easy to speak of axioms in the sense just defined in fundamental 
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physics, either relativistic or quantum. Next to nothing has the self-evidence of axioms, and most 
of the uses of the term “axiom” are in effect closer to that of “postulate” as just defined.  
Einstein’s distinction between “constructive” and “principle” theories represents two 
contrasting, although in practice often intermixed, ways of thinking in fundamental physics. 
Before I explain them, I would like to give an example, one of the earliest examples of the use of 
a principle in modern physics, Pierre de Fermat’s “principle of least time,” eventually developed 
(a number of figures were involved) into the principle of least action. Both principles involve 
postulates. Fermat used the principle to explain the so-called Snell law describing the refraction 
of light passing through a slab of glass. Fermat’s principle was not necessary or even especially 
helpful at the time, because one could more easily use the Snell law in doing calculations in 
specific cases, while one would ultimately need the calculus of variations to do so from Fermat’s 
principle and to give it a proper mathematical expression. However, Fermat’s principle defined 
how nature works, and as such, it was profound and far-reaching, especially once it was 
developed into the principle of least action. The subsequent history of physics has demonstrated 
the profundity and power of this principle on many occasions, including in relativity and 
quantum mechanics. It played key roles in D. Hilbert’s derivation of Einstein’s equations of 
general relativity and E. Noether’s proof of her celebrated theorems relating symmetry and 
conservation laws.  
According to Einstein, “constructive theories” aim “to build up a picture of the more 
complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they 
start out,” which customarily implies that this simpler formal scheme describes, at least ideally 
and in principle, the ultimate underlying reality responsible for this phenomena [4, p. 228].  
Einstein’s example of a constructive theory in classical physics is the kinetic theory of gases, 
which “seeks to reduce mechanical, thermal, and diffusional processes to movements of 
molecules—i.e., to build them up out of the hypothesis of molecular motion,” described by the 
laws of classical mechanics [4, p. 228]. This assumption was in effect abandoned by Planck in 
building his black body radiation theory, which led to the rise of quantum physics, although it 
was Einstein and not Planck (hence “in effect”) who was the first to realize this incompatibility 
between Planck’s quantum hypothesis and this underlying hypothesis of classical statistical 
physics [13]. One could, however, build quantum theory independently of this assumption or 
indeed independently of constructing “the materials of a relatively simple [underlying] formal 
scheme,” but instead as a principle theory, as Heisenberg did in the case of matrix mechanics. 
It contrast to constructive theories, principle theories, according to Einstein, “employ the 
analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which form their basis and starting point are 
not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural 
processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria which the separate 
processes or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy” [4, p. 228]. Einstein’s 
emphasis on “mathematically formulated criteria” is crucial, and it played a major role in 
Heisenberg’s and Dirac’s thinking as well. Thermodynamics, Einstein’s example of a classical 
principle theory (parallel to the kinetic theory of gases as a constructive theory), is a principle 
theory because it “seeks by analytical means to deduce necessary conditions, which separate 
events have to satisfy, from the universally experienced fact that perpetual motion is impossible” 
[4, p. 228]. Heisenberg’s thinking leading to his discovery of quantum mechanics was similarly 
principle, and perhaps influenced by thermodynamics, along with (this is known) Einstein’s 
special relativity, which was a principle theory as well. Einstein, it may be added, implied the 
kinetic theory of gases could be not be derived from thermodynamics. He then adopted a parallel 
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view that a proper, constructive theory of quantum processes (which he wanted to be a theory of 
continuous classical-like fields) could not be derived from quantum mechanics. 
Principles, then, are “empirically discovered, general characteristics of natural processes, … 
that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes or the 
theoretical representations of them have to satisfy.” I shall adopt this definition of “principle” 
here, including the requirement of “mathematically formulated criteria” to which empirically 
discovered elements and physical principles give rise, a requirement that is crucial and plays a 
major role in the present analysis. I shall, however, add the following qualification (which would 
probably have been accepted by Einstein). Principles are not so much empirically discovered as 
formulated, constructed, on the basis of empirically discovered or established features of 
scientific experience. (This “construction,” as is that of the mathematics of a principle theory, is 
of course different from the synthetic theoretical construction of an underlying theoretical 
scheme on the basis of which the phenomena considered might be explained, in a constructive 
theory.) As Einstein argued on many occasions (against empiricism, such as that of Mach), it 
would be difficult to see “general characteristics of natural processes” as ever merely empirically 
given. “The impossibility of perpetual motion” could hardly be seen as empirically given; it was 
instead formulated, as a principle, on the basis of empirically established evidence. Principles, 
thus, need not have the self-evidence of axioms or, at least initially, the assumption-like 
character of postulate, although, once introduced, they may function as postulates or even axioms 
from which a given theory is built by means of logical rules and deductions. This article will 
further amplify this understanding of principles, by seeing a principle, as it was by Bohr, 
Heisenberg, and Dirac, as a foundation and guidance for in inventing and building a new theory.  
Einstein, who by the time of quantum mechanics had developed a strong preference for 
constructive theories, hoped that quantum mechanics, as a principle theory, would be replaced by 
a constructive theory, closer to E. Schrödinger’s initial wave approach (which is constructive), 
much preferred by Einstein, vs. Heisenberg’s matrix version (which is principle). In addition, 
Schrödinger’s wave mechanics was very much in accord with Einstein’s own program, fully in 
place by then, for a unified field theory, which aimed to derive quantum discreteness from a 
continuous classical-like field theory (which Einstein was never able to do, any more than 
Schrödinger was, in his several attempts at such a theory). By contrast, as will be discussed in 
detail below, for Heisenberg, quantum discreteness was one of the primary postulates and 
principle, although the concept requires a complex interpretation, ultimately developed by Bohr. 
While less committed to the constructive approach at the time than he eventually became, 
Einstein entertained a similar hope in his initial work on the old quantum theory, which was not 
constructive or even principle, as his special relativity was, but rather, as he called it then, 
“heuristic” [14]. For a while Einstein saw his theoretical thinking, intriguingly along with that of 
Bohr, as primarily principle, and even at the time of his introduction of this distinction in 1919, 
Einstein still recognized the pretty much equal value of each type of theory. However, his 
preference for constructive theories, defined by “free conceptual construction” and mathematics 
that embodies this construction (rather than only giving mathematical expression to physical 
principles) grew, ultimately to the point of a near unconditional insistence on them, which 
defined Einstein’s thinking by the time quantum mechanics entered the picture [15, p. 47; 16]. 
Constructive theories tend to be, and are often aimed to be, realist or ontological, insofar as 
they describe, usually causally, the corresponding objects in nature and their behavior by way of 
mathematical models, assumed to idealize how nature works at the simpler, or deeper, level thus 
constructed by a theory. This characterization will serve in this article as the definition of a 
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realist or ontological theory. Such a theory, thus, offers a description of the processes underlying 
and connecting the observable phenomena considered, on the model of classical mechanics, from 
which quantum theory departs, thereby also divorcing the theory from the description of the 
observed phenomena and connections between them, and hence relating to quantum phenomena 
and the reality underlying them otherwise. By “reality” itself I shall refer to that which actually 
exists or is assumed to exist. In the case of physics, it is, ultimately, nature or matter, which is 
generally, but not always, assumed to exist independently of our interaction with it, and to have 
existed when we did not exist and to continue to exist when we will no longer exist. What is that 
which exists or is assumed to exist, and how it exists, is a matter of perspective, interpretation, 
and debate.  
According to this definition, realism or ontology is not only a claim concerning the existence 
of something but also and primarily a claim concerning the character of this existence. The 
definitions of reality, realism, and ontology just given cannot claim to capture all of the deeper 
physical and philosophical aspects of these concepts. They are, however, sufficient for my 
purposes. I might add that all modern, post-Galilean, physical theories proceed by way of 
idealized mathematical models, even if these models are not realist, descriptive. Some of the 
models used in quantum theory or its interpretations are of this nonrealist kind, insofar as, 
according to them, quantum mechanics or higher-level quantum theories are only predictive, and 
moreover only probabilistically predictive. Both Heisenberg and Dirac adopt this latter view of 
quantum mechanics or quantum electrodynamics, following Bohr and “the spirit of Copenhagen,” 
as Heisenberg called it [2, p. iv].3 This suggests a general definition of a mathematical model, 
which I shall adopt here. A mathematical model is a mathematical structure or set of 
mathematical structures that enables any type of relation, descriptive or predictive, to the 
(observed) phenomena or objects (which need not be observable, and quantum objects are not) 
considered. Such a model is always constructed, although it may be that of either a constructive 
or a principle physical theory. Realist mathematical models are descriptive models—idealized 
mathematical descriptions of physical processes. It may be noted that the probabilistic character 
of quantum predictions must be equally maintained by realist interpretations of these theories or 
alternative theories (such as Bohmian theories), because it corresponds to what is actually 
observed in quantum experiments, concerning which only probabilistic or statistical predictions 
are possible. This is because the repetition of identically prepared experiments, in general, leads 
to different outcomes, a difference that, unlike in classical physics, cannot be improved beyond a 
certain limit (defined by Planck’s constant, h) by improving the conditions of measurement, a 
fact also reflected in the uncertainty relations. This constitutes the quantum probability principle, 
the QP principle, used by Heisenberg in his discovery of quantum mechanics and given by him a 
mathematical expression, explained below. On the other hand, even such predictive 
interpretations generally assume, as those of Bohr, Heisenberg, and Dirac did, the concept of 
reality. If, however, realism, as just defined, presupposes a description or at least a conception of 
reality, this concept of reality is that of “reality without realism,” the concept and principle, the 
RWR principle, that implies that a theory that follows this principle is a principle theory, 
although it may also be defined by other principles.4  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 I distinguish “the spirit of Copenhagen” from “the Copenhagen interpretation,” a rubric that I shall avoid, because 
there is no single such interpretation. Indeed, some interpretations designated “Copenhagen interpretations” only 
partially conform to the spirit of Copenhagen as understood here, and some do not conform to it at all.  
4 For a further discussion of the concept of reality without realism, see [17]. 
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Einstein sees his special relativity theory as a principle theory, based in two apparently, but 
only apparently, irreconcilable principles. The first is the principle of relativity, which says, in 
Einstein’s initial formulation, that “the same laws of electrodynamics and optics will be valid for 
all frames of reference for which the equation of mechanics hold good” and the second is the 
principle of the constancy of the velocity of light, regardless of the motion of the source [18, p. 
37]. These two principles are only apparently irreconcilable: special relativity theory reconciles 
them, a reconciliation that was Einstein’s great achievement. Einstein’s general relativity, his 
non-Newtonian theory of gravity, is both a principle and constructive theory. It is a principle 
theory because it is based most essentially in the equivalence principle (postulating the 
equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass). However, it also has a constructive and realist 
dimension because it represents, constructs, the physical nature of gravity as the curvature of 
space or spacetime (curved by the presence of physical bodies or fields) and describes the 
behavior of its objects accordingly, in a realist and causal manner. Accordingly, the 
mathematical embodiment of the principle of general relativity, as well as a (realist) model of the 
theory, is Riemannian geometry of, in general, variable curvature. Indeed, while in the article on 
constructive and principle theories under discussion and elsewhere in his earlier commentaries 
on the theory Einstein emphasized its principle aspects, eventually its constructive aspects took 
the primary significance in Einstein’s assessment of theory and in his thinking in general, as 
considered in [16]. 
It follows that a principle theory could be either realist or not, in the first case unavoidably 
bringing with it a constructive dimension, unless the phenomena or objects in question are 
already given, rather than being constructed as the simpler constituents of more complex 
phenomena, which is to say, have already been constructed. Constructive theories are, as I 
explained, nearly by definition realist and are usually causal, unless one uses a given 
construction as a kind of heuristic device within a predictive (principle) theory. It is also true that 
a given theoretical construction may be revealed or argued merely to provide a predictive 
mechanism for a given theory, and there are arguments to that effect concerning the status of 
spacetimes of general relativity [19]. That, however, is not the same as developing a given theory 
as a constructive one. 
Constructive theories may and often do involve principles, such as the equivalence principle 
in general relativity, or the principle of causality, found throughout modern physics from Galileo 
on until quantum mechanics put it into question. This principle, as defined, for example, by Kant 
(this definition has been commonly used since), states that, if an event takes place, it has a cause 
of which it is an effect [20, pp. 305, 308]. The principle of causality is operative in most 
constructive theories at two levels. First, the construction itself is the application, in this case 
more philosophical, of the principle of causality, insofar as “building up a picture of the more 
complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they 
start out,” presupposes a cause-effect relationship. Secondly, and this application of the principle 
of causality is physical, the formal scheme in question is usually that of an (idealized) causal 
process, in which the state of the system considered at a given moment of time determines its 
state at all future moments of time. I shall refer to this form of causality as classical causality.5 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 I distinguish causality, which is an ontological category, describing reality, from determinism, which is an 
epistemological category, describing part of our knowledge of reality, specifically our ability to predict the state of a 
system, at least as defined by an idealized model, exactly at any moment of time once we know its state at a given 
moment of time. Determinism is sometimes used in the same sense as causality, and in the case of classical 
mechanics (which deals with single objects or a sufficiently small number of objects), causality and determinism, as 
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Such causal influences are also commonly, although not always, assumed to propagate from past 
or present towards future. This requirement is strengthened by special relativity theory, which 
further restricts causes to those occurring in the backward (past) light cone of the event that is 
seen as an effect of this cause, while no event can be a cause of any event outside the forward 
(future) light cone of that event. These restrictions follow from the assumption that causal 
influences cannot travel faster than the speed of light in a vacuum, c. Principle theories do not 
require classical causality, which indeed becomes difficult, if not impossible, to assume in 
quantum physics. Relativistic “causality,” as the prohibition of the possibility of physical 
influences towards the past is usually maintained, although there are exceptions (e.g., [21, pp. 
182-209], and it may even be adopted as or linked with a principle of causality in quantum 
theory, without presuming classical causality.6 It follows that the distinction between 
constructive and principle theories is not unconditional, as Einstein came to realize as well. This 
led him to ever more complex schemes of theoretical practice in fundamental physics, while 
ultimately preferring a constructive approach, grounded, moreover, in the idea (the principle?) 
that this construction and the corresponding physical reality should emerge from a free invention 
of the mathematical scheme with only minimal, if any, connections to the experiment, as 
discussed in detail in [16]. There is, however, an asymmetry between these two types of theories: 
a constructive theory always involves principles, at least philosophical principles, while a 
principle theory need not involve constructive strata at the ultimate level considered by the 
theory, as quantum mechanics came to show, arguably, for the first time. 
Quantum mechanics or higher-level quantum theories are principle theories, at least if one 
follows the spirit of Copenhagen in interpreting them, again, the first theory that, in this 
interpretation, is strictly, irreducibly principle insofar as it precludes the claim for the 
constructive theorization of quantum objects and processes. Although, quantum mechanics has 
rarely been expressly described as a principle theory on Einstein’s definition just given (e.g., [6]), 
this nature of quantum mechanics, at least matrix mechanics, in interpretations in the spirit of 
Copenhagen was manifested from the outset, in contrast to Schrödinger’s wave mechanics. As 
noted above, the latter was constructive, even though it proceeded from principles as well. 
Schrödinger’s mathematics, equivalent to that of Heisenberg, could be and, beginning with Bohr 
and Heisenberg, has been interpreted in the spirit of Copenhagen. Indeed, if understood in this 
spirit, quantum mechanics is a principle theory by definition, because of the fundamentally 
nonrealist character of the corresponding interpretations, such as that of Bohr, or more accurately 
(because Bohr’s views evolved), Bohr’s ultimate interpretation. In this type of interpretation, it is 
not possible to “construct” the ultimate entities, quantum objects, from which the observable 
quantum phenomena are built or due to which these phenomena arise, unless one sees quantum 
objects as constructed by quantum theory as fundamentally unconstructible. It follows that, in 
this type of interpretation, quantum mechanics or higher-level quantum theories are nonrealist, 
and that in the corresponding interpretation of quantum phenomena themselves, a realist or, by 
the same token, constructive understanding of the ultimate (“quantum”) constitution of nature 
responsible for this phenomena is, in Bohr’s words, “in principle excluded” [24, v. 2., p. 62]. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
defined here, coincide. Once a system is large enough, one needs a superhuman power to predict its behavior exactly, 
as was famously noted by P. S. Laplace. However, while it follows automatically that noncausal behavior, 
considered at the level of a given model, cannot be handled deterministically, the reverse is not true. The underlined 
qualification is necessary because we can have causal models of processes in nature that may not be causal.  
6 As will be seen, D’Ariano et al adopt a principle of causality of that type [10, p. 3, 11]. See also [22] and [23] for 
further discussions of causality in quantum theory. 
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Thus, quantum theories divorce quantum theory from the description of observed phenomena 
and connections, overt (as in classical mechanics) or hidden, between them, and relate to 
quantum phenomena otherwise, specifically in terms of predictions, which, it follows, become, 
in general, probabilistic or statistical in nature.7 Einstein hoped and indeed assumed that nature 
will eventually allows us to do better as concerns the descriptive or realist capacity of quantum 
theory or, as Einstein thought, an alternative theory that would eventually replace it. Bohr, on the 
other hand, thought that nature might not allow us to do better in dealing with quantum 
phenomena, which is not the same as that it will not, but Bohr, unlike Einstein, was not worried 
by this lack of realism or causality. These two positions define the Bohr-Einstein debate, by the 
time which (it began around 1927), Einstein’s commitment to the constructive approach vs. the 
principle one and to the primary role of mathematics in fundamental theories was nearly absolute.  
Bohr, by contrast, has always remained committed to physical principles and to experimental 
evidence as the primary measures of fundamental theories, although their mathematical character 
was essential for him as well. The question whether nature might or might not allow for a 
constructive alternative to quantum mechanics (considered as a strictly principle theory) remains 
open and continues to be intensely and even fiercely debated. Most, however, hold on to 
Einstein’s hope, and the type of view adopted by Bohr or here remains a minority view.  
Bohr’s phrase “in principle excluded,” could and, I would argue, should be read not only as 
expressing a strong prohibition on the ultimate reach of our knowledge and even thought 
concerning quantum objects and their behavior, but also as an annunciation of a new principle of 
quantum reality, defined above as the principle of “reality without realism,” the RWR principle. 
This principle maintains both the existence, reality, of quantum objects (or certain entities in 
nature that are thus idealized) and the impossibility of representing or even conceiving of the 
nature of this reality, and hence the impossibility of realism, at least as things stand now (a 
crucial qualification assumed throughout this article).8 As I shall explain in more detail below, as 
a consequence of the RWR principle, classical causality becomes automatically impossible and 
the recourse to probability, accordingly unavoidable even in considering the individual quantum 
processes and events, in conformity with the QP principle. However, this principle, even though 
it can, as will be seen, be given a (complex) mathematical expression, is an interpretive rather 
than empirical principle, and historically, it emerged when quantum mechanics was already in 
place. Heisenberg, in his initial approach to quantum mechanics, merely abandoned the project 
of describing the motion of electrons themselves because he had seen such a description as 
unachievable at the time, rather than had assumed that such a description was or might be “in 
principle excluded” [25]. His approach may, however, be seen as guided by the combination of a 
certain “proto-RWR” principle and the QP principle, as well as the principle of quantum 
discreteness (QD). As noted earlier, Schrödinger, in developing his wave mechanics, aimed at a 
constructive and realist theory. The RWR principle emerged, sometime in the mid 1930s in the 
Bohr-Einstein debate, especially in the wake of their exchange concerning the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment, introduced in 1935, which also related the question of reality 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 In doing so, quantum theory also suggested that it may true more generally, for example, as noted earlier, in 
general relativity [19], but the subject would require a separate treatment. 
8 Although Bohr does not appear to have made or possibly subscribed to the stronger claim, assumed in this article, 
of the impossibility of even any conception of quantum objects and their behavior, this claim may be seen as made 
in the spirit of Copenhagen. Not all interpretations in the spirit of Copenhagen adopt this more radical view and 
some stop short of that of Bohr. 
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to that of locality [26, 27].9 This exchange, which occurred at the height of Einstein’s work on a 
(classical-like) unified field theory, reflects and is defined by their contrasting commitments to 
the constructive (Einstein) and the principle (Bohr) approach to fundamental theories in physics.  
An appeal to fundamental principles need not imply that there is some unchanging, Platonist-
like, essence to such principles. Principles change as our experimental findings and our theories 
change, and we cannot anticipate or control all of these changes. Indeed, while having 
confidence in a given set of principles can help and drive one’s creative work, an uncritical, 
dogmatic acceptance of any such set can inhibit and even prevent an advancement of thought and 
knowledge, which may require new principles, the invention which is, I argue, one of the 
greatest forms of creativity in physics and beyond. The principles of quantum mechanics, such as 
the QP principle, replaced, within a new scope, some among the main principles of classical 
physics, which continue to remain operative within the proper scope of classical physics. Some 
of the principles of classical physics, however, extend to quantum mechanics, such as the 
principle that a physical theory must be mathematical, which defined all modern physics, 
classical, relativistic, or quantum. There could be such changes within the same physical scope, 
as in the case of general relativity theory vs. Newton’s theory of gravity, based in classical 
mechanics. Some of the principles of quantum theory have changed as well, although here the 
development of the theory after quantum mechanics (which was a change from the old quantum 
theory within the same scope) was only defined by expanding the scope of quantum theory. The 
QP principle has remained in place throughout the history of quantum mechanics, from 
Heisenberg on, although the mathematical expression of the principle was refined a few times, 
which fact tells us that there is no Platonist-like essence to the connections between mathematics 
and physics either, or even to mathematics itself, which changes, too. On the other hand, the 
correspondence principle has changed in its definition and functioning, by becoming the 
“mathematical correspondence principle,” in Heisenberg’s initial work on quantum mechanics, 
and it became even more general in Dirac’s work. While it was intimated by Heisenberg in his 
paper introducing quantum mechanics and while it could have been inferred from the 
complementarity principle, introduced in 1927, the RWR principle emerged a decade later in 
Bohr’s work, as part of his, by then changed in turn, interpretation of quantum mechanics. Later 
on, sometime in the1990s, the principles of quantum theory were developed into those of 
quantum information theory, to be discussed in Section 5. Combining the principles of relativity 
and quantum mechanics by giving precedence to the principles of quantum mechanics (as against 
the Klein-Gordon theory) led Dirac to the discovery of his equation. The discovery of antimatter, 
which was an unexpected bonus, eventually led to yet new principles, grounding quantum field 
theory and the Standard Model of elementary particle physics.  
 
3. Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Principles of Quantum Mechanics 
 
In both Heisenberg’s initial approach to quantum mechanics and Bohr’s initial interpretation of 
the theory the key principles were: 
(1) the principle of quantum discreteness or the QD principle (initially defined by what Bohr 
called “the quantum postulate,” “symbolized,” by Planck’s quantum of action, h [24, v. 1, p. 53-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Bell’s and the Kochen-Specker theorems, dealing with the EPR-type phenomena (for discrete variables) may be 
seen as lending support to this principle, in part in view of the question of locality, insofar as the latter could be 
maintained if one adopt the RWR-principle. The meaning and implications of these theorems and related findings, 
and of the concepts involved, such as locality, are under debate. I shall return to the question of locality in Section 5. 
 12!
54]), according to which all observed quantum phenomena are individual and discrete (in 
relation to each other), which is not the same as the (Democretian) atomic discreteness of 
quantum objects themselves;10  
(2) the principle of the probabilistic or statistical nature of quantum predictions, even, in 
contradistinction to classical statistical mechanics, in the case of elemental, unsubdivisible, 
quantum processes and events—the quantum probability, QP, principle, and  
(3) the correspondence principle, which, as initially used by Bohr required that the 
predictions of quantum theory must coincide with those of classical mechanics at the classical 
limit (even though the processes themselves were still quantum at this limit), but which was 
given by Heisenberg a new, more rigorous and more precise form, defined here as “the 
mathematical correspondence principle,” requiring that the equations of quantum mechanics 
convert into those of classical mechanics at the classical limit.11  
The correspondence principle was not a quantum principle, because it did not reflect the 
quantum constitution of nature, but it played an essential role in Heisenberg’s development of 
the mathematical formalism of (matrix) quantum mechanics.  
Bohr’s interpretation added a new principle: 
(4) the complementarity principle, which stems from the concept of complementarity, 
introduced by Bohr a bit later (following Heisenberg’s discovery of the uncertainty relations), 
and which requires: (a) a mutual exclusivity of certain phenomena, entities, or conceptions; and 
yet (b) the possibility of applying each one of them separately at any given point, and (c) the 
necessity of using all of them at different moments for a comprehensive account of the totality of 
phenomena that one must consider in quantum physics. 
Principles 1 and 2 are correlative, although this was understood only in retrospect, especially 
with the development of Bohr’s interpretation, eventually leading to the RWR principle, via the 
uncertainty relations and the complementarity principle.12 The RWR principle could be inferred 
from the complementarity principle, because the latter prevents us from ascertaining the 
complete composition of the “whole from parts,” to the degree this concept applies, because the 
complementary parts never add to a whole in the way they do in classical physics or relativity. 
This became especially apparent in view of the EPR-type experiments, a point to which I shall 
return in Section 5. The uncertainty relations are sometimes seen as manifesting a principle as 
well, but this view requires significant qualifications and will not be adopted here. 
While Heisenberg did not expressly refer to either the QD or the QP principle as such, both 
principles were manifestly at work in his derivation of quantum mechanics. The QP principle, 
which can be given a mathematical expression, could be considered as a primitive principle, 
primary to the RWR principle or, arguably, to any other quantum-theoretical principle. The 
RWR principle is, as I said, an interpretive inference from the QP principle, which would apply 
even in the case of causal theories of quantum phenomena, such as Bohmian mechanics. The 
latter, a constructive theory (in all of its versions), does not conform to the RWR principle and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 In the late 1930s, following his exchanges with Einstein concerning the EPR-type experiments, Bohr rethought 
this principle in terms of his concept of phenomenon [24, v. 2, p. 64]. For the discussion of Bohr’s views by the 
present author, see [28] and [29]. 
11 I have considered Heisenberg’s discovery of quantum mechanics, in terms of principles, in detail in [7, pp. 77-
137]. See also [6] for a related but a somewhat different view of Bohr’s key principles.  
12 The principle of complementarity, as formulated here, reflects more Bohr’s later works, from 1929 on (the 
concept itself was introduced in 1927), impacted by his debate with Einstein. In these works the principle is 
exemplified by the complementary nature of the position and the momentum measurements, always mutually 
exclusive and as such correlative to the uncertainty relations. See [28, 29], for the development of Bohr’s views. 
 13!
entails both realism and causality at the quantum level, even though it retains, correlatively, both 
the uncertainty relations and the irreducibly probabilistic character of quantum predictions, 
which, in Bohmian mechanics, strictly coincide with those of quantum mechanics. In classical 
physics, when the recourse to probability is involved, we proceed from causality to probability 
because of our inability to track this causality. This, while leaving room for probability, gives 
primacy to the principle of causality, which makes probability reducible, at least ideally and in 
principle, specifically in considering individual classical events. In quantum mechanics, in 
Heisenberg’s and most other derivations, probability is, again, a primitive concept and the QP 
principle is a primitive principle, as is, correlatively, the QD principle, while the RWR principle 
is interpretively inferred from the QP principle, although one could assume it to be a grounding 
principle, and Heisenberg, again, nearly did. The absence of classical causality is an automatic 
consequence of the RWR principle. As Schrödinger observed, by this point (in 1935) with some 
disparagement, if there is no definable physical state, and there is none by the RWR principle, 
one cannot assume that it changes (classically) causally [30, p. 154]. There is only relativistic 
causality, which does not require classical causality, although relativity itself is a classically 
causal theory. 
I shall now consider how the principles just described worked and were given a mathematical 
expression by Heisenberg in his discovery of (matrix) quantum mechanics, as presented in his 
original paper [25].13 Admittedly, this mathematical expression was only partially worked out 
and sometimes more intuited than properly developed. Nevertheless, Heisenberg’s creativity and 
inventiveness were remarkable. Bohr’s initial comment on Heisenberg’s discovery, in 1925 
(before Schrödinger’s version was introduced), shows a clear grasp of what was at stake: “In 
contrast to ordinary mechanics, the new quantum mechanics does not deal with a space–time 
description of the motion of atomic particles. It operates with manifolds of quantities which 
replace the harmonic oscillating components of the motion and symbolize the possibilities of 
transitions between stationary states in conformity with the correspondence principle. These 
quantities satisfy certain relations which take the place of the mechanical equations of motion 
and the quantization rules [of the old quantum theory]” [24, v. 1, p. 48]. 
In reflecting on Heisenberg’s conception of these quantities, one might observe first that, in 
order to invent a new concept of any kind, one has to construct a phenomenological entity or a 
set of such entities and relations between them. In physics, one must also give this construction a 
mathematical architecture, with which one might indeed start, as Heisenberg in effect did, and 
which enables the theory to relate to observable phenomena and measurable quantities 
associated with these phenomena. Heisenberg’s approach, as that of Dirac later on (influenced by 
Heisenberg), may even be best seen as defined by an attempt to find, first, under the guidance of 
the principles assumed, an independent (abstract) mathematical scheme that would then be 
linked, in his case (or, again, that of Dirac) to the data obtained in the quantum experiments in 
question. This approach as such is general, rather than specifically quantum-mechanical, in 
nature, and it was in fact close to that of Einstein’s more mathematical thinking, still guided by 
the equivalence principle (which is physical), in the case of general relativity, in partial contrast 
to special relativity, where mathematics was less dominant. However, again, contrary to 
Einstein’s desideratum, a theory and its phenomenal-mathematical architecture need not describe, 
in the way it does or at least may be assumed to do in classical physics or relativity, observable 
physical phenomena and connections between them (hence my emphasis on “relate”). In 
quantum mechanics, or quantum field theory, this architecture only relates to the observed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 For details, see [7 pp. 77-137]. 
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quantum phenomena probabilistically or statistically, which nevertheless allows the theory to 
remain a mathematical-experimental science of nature, in conformity with the project of modern 
physics from Galileo on. 
Heisenberg’s invention of his matrices was enabled by his idea of arranging algebraic 
elements corresponding to numerical quantities (transition probabilities) into infinite square 
tables. It is true that, once one deals with the transitions between two stationary states, rather 
than with a description of such states, matrices appear naturally, with rows and columns linked to 
each possible state respectively. This naturalness, however, became apparent or one might say, 
became natural, only in retrospect. This arrangement was a phenomenological construction, 
which amounted to that of a mathematical object, a matrix, an element of general 
noncommutative mathematical structure, part of (infinite-dimensional) linear algebra, in effect 
entailing a tensor structure of a Hilbert space, in which Heisenberg’s observables form an 
operator algebra. One can also see it as a representation of an abstract algebra, keeping in mind 
that Heisenberg’s infinite matrices were unbounded, which fact, as became apparent shortly 
thereafter, is correlativity the uncertainty relations for the corresponding continuous variables.  
Heisenberg begins his derivation with an observation along the lines of a proto-RWR 
principle: “[I]n quantum theory it has not been possible to associate the electron with a point in 
space, considered as a function of time, by means of observable quantities. However, even in 
quantum theory it is possible to ascribe to an electron the emission of radiation” [25, p. 263; 
emphasis added]. I add emphasis because, in principle, a measurement could associate an 
electron with a point in space, but, which is the main point here, not as a function of time, in the 
way it can be done in classical mechanics. Note also that we cannot definitively establish the 
moment of a given emission of radiation but can only register the outcome of this emission at a 
later time. If one adopts Bohr’s interpretation in its ultimate form, in which one cannot assign 
any properties to quantum objects themselves (not even single such properties, rather than only 
certain joint ones, which is precluded by the uncertainty relations) but only to the measuring 
instruments involved, one can see Heisenberg’s discovery in quantum-informational terms. It 
amounted to establishing a mathematical scheme that enables the processing of information 
(which is, qua information, classical) between measuring devices. I shall return to this view of 
the quantum-mechanical situation later. Heisenberg then says: “In order to characterize this 
radiation we first need the frequencies which appear as functions of two variables. In quantum 
theory these functions are in the form [originally introduced by Bohr]: 
 
v(n, n − α) =1/h {W(n) − W (n − α)}  (1) 
 
and in classical theory in the form 
 
v(n,α) = αv(n) = α/h(dW/dn)” [25, p. 263]. 
 
This difference, reflecting what I called above the quantum discreteness (QD) principle, 
introduced by Bohr and understood by him in terms of the quantum postulate following the 
introduction of quantum mechanics [24, v. 1, p. 53], leads to a difference between classical and 
quantum theories as concerns the combination relations for frequencies, which correspond to the 
Rydberg-Ritz combination rules. However, “in order to complete the description of radiation [in 
accordance, by the mathematical correspondence principle, with the Fourier representation of 
classical kinematics] it is necessary to have not only frequencies but also the amplitudes” [25, p. 
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263]. The crucial point is that, in Heisenberg’s theory and in quantum mechanics since then, 
these “amplitudes” are no longer amplitudes of any physical motions, which makes the name 
“amplitude” itself an artificial, symbolic term. These amplitudes are linked to the probabilities of 
transitions between stationary states: they are what we now call probability amplitudes. The 
corresponding probabilities are derived, from Heisenberg’s matrices, by a form of Born’s rule for 
this limited case (Born’s rule is more general). One takes square moduli of the eigenvalues of 
these matrices (or equivalently, multiply these eigenvalues by their complex conjugates), which 
gives one real numbers, corresponding, once suitably normalized, to the probabilities of observed 
events. (Technically, one also needs the probability density functions, but this does not affect the 
essential point in question.) The standard rule for adding the probabilities of alternative outcomes 
is changed to adding the corresponding amplitudes and deriving the final probability by squaring 
the modulus of the sum. The mathematical structure thus emerging is in effect that of vectors and 
(in general, noncommuting) Hermitian operators in Hilbert spaces over complex numbers, which 
spaces are in this case, infinite-dimensional, given that we deal with continuous variable. This 
structure may be seen as a mathematical expression of the QP principle. Heisenberg explains the 
situation in these, more rigorous, terms in his 1930 book [2, pp.111-122]. In his original paper, 
he argues as follows: 
The amplitudes may be treated as complex vectors, each determined by six independent components, and 
they determine both the polarization and the phase. As the amplitudes are also functions of the two 
variables n and α, the corresponding part of the radiation is given by the following expressions: 
 
Quantum-theoretical: 
 
Re{A (n, n − α)eiω(n, n − α)t} 
 
Classical: 
 
Re{Aα (n)eiω(n)αt} [25, p. 263] 
 
The problem—a difficult and, “at first sight,” even insurmountable problem—is now apparent: 
“[T]he phase contained in A would seem to be devoid of physical significance in quantum theory, 
since in this theory frequencies are in general not commensurable with their harmonics” [25, pp. 
263-264]. Heisenberg now proceeds to inventing a new theory around this problem, in effect, by 
making it into a solution, as if saying: “This is not a problem, the classical way of thinking is.” 
His new theory offers the possibility of predicting, in general probabilistically, the outcomes of 
quantum experiments, but at the cost of abandoning the physical description of the ultimate 
objects considered, a cost unacceptable to some, even to most, beginning with Einstein, but a 
new principle for Bohr, the RWR principle. Heisenberg says: “However, we shall see presently 
that also in quantum theory the phase has a definitive significance which is analogous to its 
significance in quantum theory” [25, p. 264; emphasis added). “Analogous” could only mean 
here that, rather than being analogous physically, the way the phase functions mathematically is 
analogous to the way the classical phase functions mathematically in classical theory, or 
analogous in accordance with the mathematical form of the correspondence principle, insofar as 
quantum-mechanical equations are formally the same as those of classical physics. Heisenberg 
only considered a toy model of a quantum aharmonic oscillator, and thus needed only a 
Newtonian, rather than Hamiltonian, equation for it. 
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In this way, Heisenberg gave the correspondence principle a mathematical expression, indeed 
changed it into the mathematical correspondence principle. The variables to which these 
equations apply cannot, however, be the same, because, if they were, they would not give us 
correct predictions for low quantum numbers. As Heisenberg explains, if one considers “a given 
quantity x(t) [a coordinate as a function of time] in classical theory, this can be regarded as 
represented by a set of quantities of the form 
 
Aα (n)eiω(n)αt, 
 
which, depending upon whether the motion is periodic or not, can be combined into a sum or 
integral which represents x(t): 
 
                                                                       + ∞ 
x(n, t) =∑α Aα (n) eiω(n)αt 
                                                                       – ∞ 
or 
                                                           + ∞  
x(n, t) =∫ Aα (n) eiω(n)αt dα ”   [25, p. 264]. 
                                                        – ∞      
 
Heisenberg next makes his most decisive and most extraordinary move. He notes that “a similar 
combination of the corresponding quantum-theoretical quantities seems to be impossible in a 
unique manner and therefore not meaningful, in view of the equal weight of the variables n and n 
− α” (25, p. 264). “However,” he says, “one might readily regard the ensemble of quantities A (n, 
n − α)eiω(n, n − α)t [an infinite square matrix] as a representation of the quantity x(t)” [25, p. 264]. 
The arrangement of the data into square tables is a brilliant and, as I said, in retrospect, but, 
again, only in retrospect, natural way to connect the relationships (transitions) between two 
stationary states. However, it does not by itself establish an algebra of these arrangements, for 
which one needs to find the rigorous rules for adding and multiplying these elements—rules 
without which Heisenberg cannot use his new variables in the equations of the new mechanics. 
To produce a quantum-theoretical interpretation (which, again, abandons motion and other 
concepts of classical physics at the quantum level) of the classical equation of motion that he 
considered, as applied to these new variables, Heisenberg needs to be able to construct the 
powers of such quantities, beginning with x(t)2, which is actually all that he needs for his 
equation. The answer in classical theory is obvious and, for the reasons just explained, obviously 
unworkable in quantum theory. Now, “in quantum theory,” Heisenberg proposes, “it seems that 
the simplest and most natural assumption would be to replace classical [Fourier] equations … by 
                                                                 + ∞ 
B(n, n − β)eiω(n, n − β)t =∑α A(n, n−α)A(n−α, n − β)eiω(n, n − β )t 
                                                                – ∞ 
or  
                                    + ∞ 
= ∫ A(n, n−α)A(n−α, n − β)eiω(n, n − β )t dα” [25, p. 265]. 
                                   – ∞ 
This is the main postulate, the (matrix) multiplication postulate, of Heisenberg’s new theory, 
“and in fact this type of combination is an almost necessary consequence of the frequency 
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combination rules” [25, p. 265]. This combination of the particular arrangement of the data and 
the construction of an algebra of multiplying his new variables is Heisenberg’s great invention. 
Although, it is commutative in the case of squaring a given variable, x2, this multiplication is in 
general noncommutative, expressly for position and momentum variables, and Heisenberg, 
without quite realizing it, used this noncommutativity in solving his equation, as Dirac was the 
first to notice. Taking his inspiration from Einstein’s “new kinematics” of special relativity, 
Heisenberg spoke of his new algebra of matrices as the “new kinematics.” This was not the best 
choice of term because his new variables no longer described or were even related to motion as 
the term kinematic would suggest, one of many, historically understandable, but potentially 
confusing terms. (Note that Planck’s constant, h, which is a dimensional, dynamic entity, has 
played no role thus far.) Technically, the theory, as Einstein never stopped noting, wasn’t even a 
mechanics, insofar it did not offer a description of individual quantum processes, or for that 
matter of anything. “Observables,” for the corresponding operators, and “states,” for Hilbert-
space vectors, are other such terms: we never observe these “observables” or “states,” but only 
use them to predict, probabilistically, what is observed in measuring instruments. (To make these 
predictions, one will need h, which, we recall, appears in Bohr’s frequency rules.) 
As noted above, Heisenberg’s overall scheme essentially amounts to the Hilbert-space 
formalism (with Heisenberg’s matrices as operators), introduced by J. von Neumann shortly 
thereafter, thus giving firm and rigorous mathematical foundations to Heisenberg’s scheme, by 
then developed more properly by Heisenberg himself, M. Born and P. Jordan, and, differently (in 
terms of q-numbers), by Dirac. My main point is that Heisenberg’s matrices were (re)invented by 
him from the physical principles coupled to a mathematical construction leading to an actual 
algebra, which Heisenberg had to define, beginning with the multiplication rule. This 
multiplication is noncommutative and ultimately implies tensor calculus in a Hilbert space, as 
Heisenberg was to learn later on [2, pp. 55-56, 111-122]. Dirac, who followed Heisenberg’s 
principle way of thinking in his work on both quantum mechanics and quantum electrodynamics, 
was also the first to fully realize that noncommutativity was the most essential mathematical 
feature of Heisenberg’s scheme. Remarkably, Heisenberg himself, as well as Pauli, not only did 
not think it to be essential but also thought that ultimately the theory should be freed from it, and 
Pauli initially thought that the theory should not be probabilistic either, and changed his mind on 
both counts only after Schrödinger’s equation was introduced [7, pp. 89-90]. 
The physical principle behind quantum noncommutativity and, by implication, the tensor 
structure of quantum theory is a more complex matter. In fact, it is Bohr’s complementarity 
principle. Conversely, quantum noncommutativity and this tensor structure can be seen as the 
mathematical expression of the complementarity principle, even though noncommutativity was 
discovered first, in part as a response to the QP principle. As noted above, the QP principle itself 
is given its mathematical expression, via the complex Hilbert-space structure cum conjugation, 
inherent in this structure, and Born’s rule. This structure is, however, in turn coupled to 
complementarity, a coupling manifested in the uncertainty relations. Finally, insofar as the 
complementarity principle implies, at least if one follows the spirit of Copenhagen, the RWR 
principle, too, is mathematically expressed in noncommutativity or, again, the tensor structure of 
the formalism of quantum theory. 
We can thus see how the physical principles assumed by Heisenberg found their 
mathematical expression in his matrix mechanics. It is true that the relationships between the 
complementarity principle and the formalism emerged later. Also, the complementarity principle 
and the RWR principle were not expressed in the form just sketched by Bohr himself, who, 
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unlike Heisenberg, was less concerned with giving a rigorous mathematical expression to his 
principles, although Bohr did realize the relationships between them and the formalism of 
quantum theory. Indeed, as I said, even in Heisenberg’s case, these physical principles were 
given a preliminary and somewhat tentative, rather than fully rigorous, mathematical expression. 
This type of rigor would have been difficult before von Neumann gave the formalism its rigorous 
Hilbert-space form [31], although both Born and, especially, Dirac (q-numbers) made important 
steps in this direction, and Dirac’s 1930 book nearly arrived there [3]. On the other hand, as von 
Neumann’s title suggests (in contradistinction from those of Heisenberg’s and Dirac’s books [1, 
2]), in the book are primarily “the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics” rather than 
fundamental physical principles of quantum theory, even though these principles must, again, be 
given their mathematical expression. This is perhaps why von Neumann’s work never especially 
appealed to Bohr. It would not be accurate to say that von Neumann does not deal at all with 
such principles. He does. But his main focus is elsewhere, on recasting quantum mechanics into 
a rigorous mathematical form, rather than deriving it from new physical principles, in the way 
Heisenberg and Dirac do in the case of, respectively, quantum mechanics and quantum 
electrodynamics, or in the way quantum information theory aims to do. “Foundations” is a more 
general category and may refer to either physical or mathematical, or philosophical, foundations 
of a theory, in the sense of what essentially grounds it. 
 
4. Dirac’s Equation: How to Combine, and How Not to Combine, the Principles of 
Relativity and Quantum Theory  
 
Dirac’s thinking in his approach to the problem of the free relativistic electron was shaped by the 
following considerations. In order to equally respect, as such an equation must, the principles of 
relativity and quantum theory, certain specific mathematical features were required, two of them 
in particular. While, however, formally mathematical (Dirac followed Heisenberg insofar as his 
aim was the invention, first, of a consistent mathematical scheme by means of which one could 
predict the outcomes of relevant experiments), these features reflected and emerged from 
fundamental physical principles of (special) relativity theory and quantum theory, as embodied 
in quantum mechanics. This made Dirac’s theory, represented in his equation, a principle theory 
rather than a constructive theory. It was not constructive because, as quantum mechanics, if 
understood, as it was by Dirac, in the spirit of Copenhagen, Dirac’s equation did not describe the 
motion of electrons in space and time, but only predicted the probabilities of registered events, 
those of collisions between electrons and measuring instruments, in accordance with the QP 
principle. The mathematical features in question were as follows. The first feature, stemming 
from the principles of special relativity theory, was that time and space must enter symmetrically 
and indeed that space and time must be interchangeable, which was not the case in Schrödinger’s 
nonrelativistic equation for the electron, because it contained the first derivative of time and the 
second derivatives of coordinates. The second, stemming from the principles of quantum theory 
was that the equation must be a first-order linear differential equation in time, just as 
Schrödinger’s equation was. 
This feature is linked to several other key features of quantum-mechanical formalism, related 
to physical phenomena and the principles of quantum theory. Among these additional features 
were the noncommutativity of quantum variables, linear superposition or linearity in general, and 
the conservation of the probability current, which entails a positive definite probability density 
and which, combined with the first order derivative in time, may be seen as unitarity, following 
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[11]. The QP principle is given a mathematical expression in Dirac’s theory analogously to the 
way it was by Heisenberg in quantum mechanics, as discussed above, but within a more complex 
mathematical formalism employed by Dirac. This broader accord with quantum mechanics made 
Dirac’s theory and his equation fundamentally quantum in character.  
Another key affinity with Heisenberg’s approach was Dirac’s use of the mathematical 
correspondence principle (not, as I said, a quantum principle, but instrumental in building the 
mathematics of quantum mechanic), which was defined by the fact that at the classical limit the 
equations of quantum mechanics convert into those of classical physics. Dirac used the 
mathematical correspondence principle in his earlier work on quantum mechanics, inspired by 
Heisenberg’s paper. Indeed, while Heisenberg did use the principle, it was Dirac who appears to 
have been the fist to expressly formulate it as the mathematical correspondence principle. In his 
first paper on quantum mechanics, he said: “The correspondence between the quantum and 
classical theories lies not so much in the limiting agreement when h = 0 as in the fact that the 
mathematical operations on the two theories obey in many cases the same [formal] laws” [32, p. 
315]. Applying the principle in the case of his equation meant that at the nonrelativistic quantum 
limit this equation would convert into Schrödinger’s equation. Proving this fact was 
mathematically more difficult than in Heisenberg’s case, where the application of the principle 
was nearly automatic because he started with classical equations. Dirac’s use of the principle 
also suggests the following extension of it. The mathematical formalism of a given higher-level 
quantum theory should at the lower limit convert into the mathematical formalism of the 
corresponding lower-level theory (usually already established). Thus, for example, in the case of 
string or brane theory, this means that its equations should, at the corresponding lower limit, 
covert into those of quantum field theory. As will be seen, D’Ariano and Perinotti’s derivation of 
Dirac’s equation might be seen as an enactment of this generalized mathematical correspondence 
principle, because Dirac’s equation, which belongs to the usual (Fermi) scale of high-energy 
physics, “emerges from the large-scale [extending to Planck’s scale] dynamics of the minimum-
dimension QCA [quantum cellular automaton]” [11, p. 1]. That said, however, unlike Heisenberg 
(who borrowed his equation from classical physics, while inventing new quantum variables), 
Dirac did not use the mathematical correspondence principle, as opposed to other quantum 
principles just mentioned, to derive his equation, which was a new equation even formally, in 
this respect more akin to Schrödinger’s equation. 
Dirac’s thinking leading his to his equation was further shaped by the following interrelated 
factors: 
(1) The influence of Heisenberg’s thinking leading to the discovery of quantum 
mechanics, as discussed in Section 3. Dirac studied Heisenberg’s paper introducing 
quantum mechanics very carefully, and it left, I would argue, a lasting impact on all 
of his thinking and work. Heisenberg’s paper was in many ways preliminary, and was 
developed into a full-fledged matrix mechanics a few months later by Heisenberg 
himself, M. Born, and P. Jordan. Dirac, unfamiliar with this subsequent work, arrived 
at his own, equally full-fledged, version, based in his q-number formalism, 
independently [27]. Heisenberg’s paper, however, fully embodied these principles and 
introduced and refined some of them. 
(2) Dirac’s work on his the transformation theory, his “darling,” as he called it. It was 
introduced by Dirac in 1926, while in Bohr’s Institute in Copenhagen, and 
independently discovered by Jordan at the same time [33]. The transformation theory 
was especially important for Dirac’s work on his equation, as concerned linearity in 
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∂/∂t, and the positive definite probability density, both central to the transformation 
theory, which encoded the principles of quantum mechanics most generally, because 
it encompassed both Heisenberg’s and Schrödinger’s mechanics. 
(3) Dirac’s 1926 work on quantum electrodynamics (short of its relativistic form) [34]. 
These factors made Dirac better prepared than others at the time for the discovery of his equation, 
which is not to say, quite the contrary, that the originality of his thinking had not played a 
decisive role in this discovery. Indeed, although Dirac’s logic described above seems eminently 
reasonable in retrospect, it appears that only Dirac thought of the situation in this way at the time. 
His famous conversation with Bohr that occurred then is revealing:  
Bohr: What are you working on?  
Dirac: I am trying to get a relativistic theory of the electron.  
Bohr: But Klein already solved that problem [35].  
Dirac disagreed, and, for the reasons just explained, it is clear why he did, and why Bohr should 
have known better. The Klein-Gordon equation, to which Bohr referred, is relativistic and 
symmetrical in space and time, but it is not first-order linear differential equation in either, 
because both variables enter via the second derivative. One can derive the continuity equation 
from it, but the probability density is not positive definite. By the same token, the Klein-Gordon 
equation does not give us the correct equation, Schrödinger’s equation 
  
 
 
at the nonrelativistic limit. Schrödinger, who appears to be the first to have written down the 
Klein-Gordon equation in the process of his discovery of his wave mechanics, abandoned it in 
view of the incorrect predictions it gave in the nonrelativistic limit. On the other hand, Dirac’s 
equation, which could be seen as a square root of the Klein-Gordon equation, does convert into 
Schrödinger’s equation in the nonrelativistic limit, which, again, was a major factor in Dirac’s 
thinking. Technically, at its immediate nonrelativistic limit, Dirac’s theory converts into Pauli’s 
spin-matrix theory, while Schrödinger’s equation, which does not contain spin, is the limit of 
Pauli’s theory, if one neglects spin [36]. Thus, the Klein-Gordon equation was not a right way of 
bringing the principles of relativity and quantum theory together. Dirac’s equation found the 
right way to do so by, mathematically, taking a square root of the Klein-Gordon equation, which 
may not be so difficult by current mathematical standards of theoretical physics, but was 
nontrivial at the time.14 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Einstein developed a major interest in Dirac’s equation, as a spinor equation, and he used it, in his collaborations 
with W. Mayer, as part of his program for the unified field theory, conceived as a classical-like field theory, 
modeled on general relativity, and in opposition to quantum mechanics and, by then, quantum field theory. 
Accordingly, he only considered a classical-like spinor form of Dirac’s equation, thus depriving it of (Einstein might 
have thought “freeing” it from) its quantum features, most fundamentally, discreteness (h did not figure in Einstein’s 
form of Dirac’s equation), and probability. Einstein hoped but failed to derive discreteness from the underlying 
field-continuity. As noted above, by this point Einstein abandoned the principle approach in favor of the 
constructive approach, and his use on Dirac’s equation was part of this new way of thinking. He was primarily 
interested in the mathematics of spinors, which he generalized in what he called “semivectors.” While relevant, 
including in the context of the quantum-informational (principle) derivation of Dirac’s equation in Section 5 [11], 
the subject is beyond my scope here. It is extensively discussed in [16]. It is worth noting that, unlike Einstein, O. 
Klein (for example, in his version of the Kaluza-Klein theory) always took quantum principles, especially 
discreteness, as primary, rather than aiming, as Einstein, to derive quantum discreteness from an underlying 
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Dirac’s mathematical task was more difficult than that of Heisenberg because the conditions 
just outlined required both new variables, as in Heisenberg’s scheme, and, in contrast to 
Heisenberg’s scheme (which used the equations of classical mechanics), a new equation. In other 
words, as I said, Dirac didn’t use the mathematical correspondence principle to derive his 
equation, but only to show that it converts into Schrödinger’s equation at the quantum-
mechanical limit. Dirac did, however, use the Klein-Gordon equation, of which he took a “square 
root,” to satisfy the necessary principles of quantum mechanics and to give then a proper 
(relativistic) mathematical expression. As those of Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics, Dirac’s new 
variables proved to be noncommuting matrix-type variables, but of a more complex character, 
involving the so-called spinors and the multicomponent wave functions, the concept discovered 
by Pauli in his nonrelativistic theory of spin [36]. Just as Heisenberg’s matrices earlier, Dirac’s 
spinors had never been used in physics previously, although they were introduced in 
mathematics by W. C. Clifford about fifty years earlier (following the work of H. Grassmann on 
exterior algebras). And just as Heisenberg in the case of his matrices, Dirac was unaware of the 
existence of spinors and reinvented them.  
In spite of the elegant simplicity of its famous compact form,  
 
iγ·∂ψ = mψ, 
 
reproduced on the plate in Westminster Abbey commemorating Dirac, Dirac’s equation encodes 
an extremely complex Hilbert-space machinery. The equation, as introduced by Dirac, was 
 
 !"!! + ! !!!!!!!! ! ! !, ! = !ℏ !"(!,!)!"  
 
The new mathematical elements here are the 4×4 matrices αk and β and the four-component 
wave function ψ. The Dirac matrices are all Hermitian, 
 
 
 
(I4 is the identity matrix), and the mutually anticommute: 
 
 
 
The above single symbolic equation unfolds into four coupled linear first-order partial 
differential equations for the four quantities that make up the wave function. The matrices form a 
basis of the corresponding Clifford algebra. One can think of Clifford algebras as quantizations 
of Grassmann’s exterior algebras, in the same way that the Weyl algebra is a quantization of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
continuity of a classical-like field theory. That is hardly surprising coming from a long-time assistant of Bohr. 
Klein’s thinking, which led to several major contributions, was always quantum-oriented. It is just that the Klein-
Gordon equation did not manage to bring quantum theory and relativity together successfully. The equation itself 
was later used in meson theory. Of course, Dirac’s equation, too, was a unification of quantum mechanics and 
special relativity, albeit not of the kind Einstein wanted. 
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symmetric algebra. Here, p is the momentum operator in Schrödinger’s sense, but in a more 
complicated Hilbert space than in standard quantum mechanics. The wave function ψ (t, x) takes 
value in a Hilbert space X = C4 (Dirac’s spinors are elements of X). For each t, y (t, x) is an 
element of H = L2 (R3; X) = L2 (R3)  X = L2 (R3)  C4. This mathematical architecture allows 
one to predict the probabilities of quantum-electro-dynamical (high-energy) events, which, as 
explained below, have a greater complexity than quantum-mechanical (low-energy) events. 
Finding new matrix-type variables or, more generally, Hilbert-space operators became the 
defining mathematical element of quantum theory. The current theories of weak forces, 
electroweak unifications, and strong forces (quantum chromodynamics) were all discovered by 
finding such variables. This is correlative to establishing the transformation group, a Lie group, 
of the theory and finding representations of this group in the corresponding Hilbert spaces. This 
is true for Heisenberg’s matrix variables as well, as was discovered by H. Weyl and E. Wigner, 
for the Heisenberg group. In modern elementary-particle theory, irreducible representations of 
such groups correspond to elementary particles, the idea that was one of Wigner’s major 
contributions to quantum physics [37]. This was, for example, how M. Gell-Mann discovered 
quarks, because at the time there were no particles corresponding to the irreducible 
representations (initially there were three of those, corresponding to three quarks) of the 
symmetry group of the theory, the so-called SO (3). It is the group of all rotations around the 
origin in the three-dimensional space, R3, rotations represented by all three-by-three orthogonal 
matrices with determinant 1. (This group is noncommutative.) The electroweak group that Gell-
Mann helped to find as well is SU (2), the group of two by two matrices with the determinant 1. 
Quarks are part of both theories. The genealogy of this group-theoretical thinking extends from 
Dirac’s four by four matrices and, earlier, Pauli’s two by two spin matrices. Gell-Mann famously 
borrowed the term quark from James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, which, as my epigraph suggests, 
might, in its notorious complexity, have been in turn inspired by quantum theory. 
Dirac begins his paper by commenting on previous relativistic treatments of the electron, 
specifically the Klein-Gordon equation and its insufficiencies. He says:  
[The Gordon-Klein theory] appears to be satisfactory so far as emission and absorption of radiation are 
concerned, but is not so general as the interpretation of the non-relativi[stic] quantum mechanics, which has 
been developed sufficiently to enable one to answer the question: What is the probability of any dynamical 
variable at any specified time having a value laying between any specified limits, when the system is 
represented by a given wave function ψn? The Gordon-Klein interpretation can answer such questions if 
they refer to the position of the electron … but not if they refer to its momentum, or angular momentum, or 
any other dynamic variable. We would expect the interpretation of the relativi[stic] theory to be just as 
general as that the non-relativi[stic] theory. [1, pp. 611-612]  
The term “interpretation” means here a mathematical representation of the physical situation, 
rather than, as is common now, a physical interpretation of a given quantum formalism cum the 
phenomena it relates to. Dirac’s statement does not mean that a physical description of quantum 
processes in space and time is provided, as against only predictions, in general probabilistic, of 
the outcomes of quantum experiments. As is clear from this passage, Dirac thought the capacity 
of a given theory to enable such predictions sufficient if such predictions are possible for any 
dynamic variable. The main deficiency of the Klein-Gordon scheme was its inability to answer 
the following question, which indeed define all quantum theory as we understand it since 
quantum mechanics: “What is the probability of any dynamical variables at any specified time 
having a value laying between any specified limits, when the system is represented by a given 
wave function ψn?” Dirac then argues that the derivative first-order in time, missing in the Klein-
Gordon equation, is a proper starting point for the relativistic theory of the electron. He says: 
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“The general interpretation of non-relativi[stic] quantum mechanics is based on the 
transformation theory, and is made possible by the wave equation being of the form 
 H!–W ψ = 0,  (1) 
 
i.e., being linear in W or  !!", so that the wave function at any time determines the wave function 
at any later time. The wave function of the relativi[stic] theory must also be linear in W if the 
general interpretation is to be possible” [1, p. 612]. 
Before proceeding to his derivation, Dirac comments, in the statement with which I began 
here, on the second difficulty of the Klein-Gordon equation, that of the transitions from states of 
positive energy to those of negative energy. Dirac’s theory inherits this difficulty because 
mathematically every solution of Dirac’s equation is a solution of the Klein-Gordon equation, of 
which Dirac’s equation is a square root. (The opposite is not true.) Luckily for the future of 
quantum theory, the difficulty proved to be not the weakness but the strength of Dirac’s theory.    
Dirac’s derivation of his equation follows two key principles. The first is the invariance 
under Lorentz transformations (a relativity principle). The second is the mathematical 
correspondence principle: the equivalence of whatever the new equation one finds to 
Schrödinger’s equation (equation (1) above) in the limit of large quantum numbers, which 
requires correspondence with Pauli’s spin theory as an intermediate step [1, p. 613]. Other key 
quantum principles are fulfilled and given their mathematical expression automatically once this 
correspondence, again, lacking in the Klein-Gordon theory, is in place. 
In the absence of the external field, which Dirac considers first and to which I shall restrict 
myself here, since it is sufficient for my main argument, the Klein-Gordon equation “reduces to 
   −!!! !+ !!! + !!!!! ψ = 0 (3) 
 
if one puts !! =!! = ! ℏ! !!" ” 
[1, p. 613] 
 
Next Dirac uses the symmetry between time, p0 , and space, p1, p2, p3, required by relativity, 
which implies that because the Hamiltonian one needs is linear in p0, “it must also be linear in p1, 
p2, and p3.” He then says: 
 
[the necessary] wave equation is therefore in the form 
 !! + α!!!! + !α!!! + !α!!! + ! ψ = 0  (4) 
  
where for the present all that is known about the dynamical variables or operators α1, α2, 
α3, and β is that they are independent of p0 , p1, p2, p3, i.e., that they commute with t, x1, 
x2, x3.  Since we are considering the case of a particle moving in empty space, so that all 
points in space are equivalent, we should expect the Hamiltonian not to involve t, x1, x2, 
x3. This means that α!,α!,α!, and ! are independent of t, x1, x2, x3, i.e., that they 
commute with p0, p1, p2, p3. We are therefore obliged to have other dynamical variables 
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besides the co-ordinates and momenta of the electron, in order that α!,α!,α!,! may be 
functions of them. The wave function ψ must then involve more variables than merely x1, 
x2, x3, t. 
Equation (4) leads to  
 0 = −!! + α!!! + !α!!! + !!!!! + ! !! + α!!! + !α!!! + !α!!! + ! ψ = [−!!! + !Σα!!!!! + !Σ !!!! + !!!!! !!!! + !!! + !Σ !!! + !!!! ]ψ 
 (5) 
 
where Σ refers to cyclic permutation of the suffixes 1, 2, 3. [1, p. 613] 
 
I pause here to reflect on Dirac’s way of thinking, manifested in this passage and throughout his 
derivation of his equation. Taking advantage of noncommutativity in (5) is worth a special notice 
not only because this is one of Dirac’s forte but also because, as Dirac was, as I said, among the 
first to realize, it represents the mathematical essence of quantum theory and is crucial to the 
mathematical expression of its fundamental principles. Equation (4), a square root of (3), the 
Klein-Gordon equation, is already Dirac’s equation in abstract algebraic terms, thus, expressing 
Dirac’s approach of finding, first, an abstract mathematical scheme suitable for the expression of 
the principles of quantum theory and, correlatively, for predicting the data in question in his 
relativistic theory of the electron. One will now need to find αn and β, to find the actual form of 
the equation. Inspired by that of Heisenberg as it was, Dirac’s approach is different from that of 
Heisenberg. While mathematics and the invention of a cohesive formal mathematical scheme are 
no less important for Heisenberg, one does not find in Heisenberg the same kind of, to use 
Dirac’s word, play with (still more) abstract structures that is characteristic of Dirac [35]. Dirac’s 
earlier work on q-numbers quantum-mechanical formalism already displayed this power of 
abstract mathematical thinking, again, however, arising from and governed by physical 
principles of quantum theory. It is true that antimatter was a consequence of the mathematical 
structure of Dirac’s equation. This is not uncommon in theoretical physics, whether constructive 
or principle: new physical objects are discovered and new physical principles are often 
established as consequences of the mathematical formalism. This is what happened in the case of 
Dirac’s equation as well. Nevertheless, Dirac’s equation was what it was because of the 
fundamental physical principles on which it was based. It is equally crucial, however, that this 
equation mathematically expressed these principles. Dirac now proceeds as follows: 
[Equation (5)] agrees with (3) [the Klein-Gordon equation, in the absence of the external field (−!!! + !!! +!!!!)ψ] if 
 !! = 1,!!!! !+ !!!!! = 0! ! ≠ ! !!, ! = 1,2,3. !! = !!!!!, !!! + !!!! = 0 
 
If we put ! = !!!!", these conditions become 
 !!! = 1,!!!! + !!!!! = 0!(!! ≠ !) 
     !, ! = 1, 2, 3, 4.  (6) 
 
[1, p. 613] 
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Dirac, again, takes advantage of a partial mathematical correspondence with the Klein-Gordon 
equation (that between the function of a complex variable and its square root), which allows him 
to derive certain algebraic conditions that αµ and β must satisfy. Dirac will now state that “we 
can suppose αµ’s to be expressed in some matrix scheme, the matrix elements of αµ being, 
say,!! !(!!!")” [1, p. 613]. This supposition is not surprising given both the formal mathematical 
considerations (such as the anticommuting relations between them) and the preceding history of 
matrix mechanics, including Dirac’s own previous work. We know or may safely assume from 
Dirac’s account of his work on his equations that matrix manipulation, “playing with equations,” 
as he called it, was one of his starting points [35]. In addition, Pauli’s theory, which is about to 
enter Dirac’s argument, provided a ready example of a matrix scheme [36; 38, pp. 55-56, 60]. It 
was clear that matrix algebra of some sort is a good candidate for αµ. Dirac, again, gets 
extraordinary mileage from considering the formal properties of the variables involved, even 
before considering what these variables actually are and as a way of gauging what they should be, 
which is his next step, which reveals another remarkable consequence of the necessity of the 
particular matrix variables required by Dirac. For if we “suppose αµ’s to be expressed in some 
matrix scheme, the matrix elements of αµ being, say, !! !(!!!"),” then “the wave function ψ must 
be a function of ! as well as x1, x2, x3, t. The result of !! multiplied into ψ will be a function (!! ,ψ) of x1, x2, x3, t, !!defined by  
 !! ,ψ !, !, ! = !Σ!!!!! ! !!! ψ!(!, !, !!)”  [1, p. 614]. 
 
Dirac is now prepared “for finding four matrices αµ to satisfy the conditions (6),” those forming 
the Clifford algebra, and for finding the actual form of variables that satisfy formal equation (4) 
or (5). Dirac considers first the three Pauli spin matrices, which satisfy the conditions (6), but not 
the equations (4) or (5), which needs four by four matrices. He says: 
We make use of the matrices 
 !! = 0 11 0 ; !!! = 0 −!! 0 ; !!! = 1 00 1  
 
which Pauli introduced to describe the three components of the spin angular momentum.  These matrices 
have just the properties 
 !!! = 1!!!!!! + !!!!! = 0!(! ≠ !),  (7) 
 
that we require for our α’s. We cannot, however, just take the σ’s to be thereof our α’s, because then it 
would not be possible to find the fourth. We must extend the s’s in a diagonal matter to bring in two more 
rows and columns, so that we can introduced three more matrices r1, r2, r3 of the same form as s1, s2, s3, but 
referring to different rows and columns, thus: 
 
 
!! = ! 0!!0!!1!!00!!!0!!0!!11!!0!!0!!00!!1!!0!!0 ; !!! = !
0!!0!– !!!00!!0!!0 − !!!!0!!0!!00!!!!!0!0 ; !!! = !
1!!0!!0!!00!!1!!0!!00!!0 − 1!00!!0!!0! − 1 ; 
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!! = 0!!1!!0!!01!!0!!0!!00!!0!!0!!10!!0!!1!!0 ; !!! = !
0!– !!!0!!0!!!0!!0!!00!!0!!0! − !0!!0!!!!!0 ; !!! =
1!!0!!0!!00 − 1!!0!!00!!0!!1!!00!!0!!0! − 1 ; 
 
 
 
The ρ’s are obtained from σ’s by interchanging the second and the third row, and the second and the third 
columns. We now have, in addition to equations (7) 
 !!! = 1!!!!!!!!! + !!!!! = 0!(!! ≠ !), 
 
and also  !!!! = !!!!! (7&) 
 
[1, p. 615] 
 
These matrices are Dirac’s great invention, parallel to Heisenberg’s invention of his matrix 
variables. Dirac’s matrices form the basis of the corresponding Clifford algebra and define the 
mathematical architecture where the multicomponent relativistic wave function for the electron 
appears from the first principles, in contrast to Pauli’s theory where the two-component 
nonrelativistic wave function, necessary to incorporate spin, appears phenomenologically. Spin 
is an automatic consequence of Dirac’s theory, unintended (just as antimatter was), but 
fundamental. The entities Dirac’s matrices transform are different from either vectors or tensors 
and are called spinors, introduced, as mathematical objects, by E. Cartan (who did not use the 
term itself initially) in 1913.  
The rest of the derivation of Dirac’s equation is a nearly routine exercise, with a few elegant 
but easy matrix manipulations. Dirac also needs to prove the relativistic invariance and the 
conservation of the probability current, and to consider the case of the external field, none of 
which is automatic, but is standard textbook material at this point. The most fundamental and 
profound aspects of Dirac’s thinking as principle thinking are contained in the parts of his paper 
just discussed, and I can draw my main conclusions concerning the significance and implications 
of Dirac’s theory of the relativistic electron, which his equation embodies, from them. 
Dirac’s theory is a remarkable example of principle thinking in theoretical physics, in which 
fundamental physical principles of relativity and quantum theory combine with mathematics so 
that physics guides the mathematics, which both gives these principles their precise 
mathematical expression and leads to new physics. Dirac’s theory was not only a result of his 
confidence in already established principles, but also led to new principles, inherent or implied in 
his equation, although it took a while to realize the radical nature of these implications. The most 
crucial of them emerged from the concepts of antimatter, the most revolutionary consequence of 
Dirac’s theory (although the experimental discovery of the positron by C. D. Anderson, in 1932, 
was independent), in particular what may be called the particle-transformation principle, the PT 
principle. This principle extends and is a consequence of the antiparticle principle, which states 
that for every particle there is an antiparticle, although some particles, sometimes known as 
Majorana particles, such as photons, are their own antiparticles. The PT principle adds the loss of 
particle identity in quantum experiments to the nonrealism of the RWR principle found already 
in quantum mechanics, if interpreted in the spirit of Copenhagen. I shall now discuss the PT 
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principle, which changed our concept of the elementary particle. It is also correlative to various 
symmetry and invariance principles of quantum theory. 
As explained above, Dirac’s equation encodes a complex mathematical architecture, which 
manifests the fundamental physical principles of quantum electrodynamics and by implication 
quantum field theory. (Dirac’s equation is not quite a field equation, but given its essentially 
quantum-field-theoretical physical nature, it would also be difficult to see it in terms of 
relativistic quantum mechanics, as some suggest (e.g., [39]). The Hilbert space associated with a 
given quantum system in Dirac’s theory is a tensor product of the infinite dimensional Hilbert 
space (encoding the mathematics of continuous variables) and a finite-dimensional Hilbert space 
over complex numbers, which, in contrast to the two-dimensional Hilbert space of Pauli’s theory, 
C2, is four-dimensional in Dirac’s theory, C4. (Spin is contained in the theory automatically.) 
Dirac’s wave function ψ (t, x) takes value in a Hilbert space X = C4 (Dirac’s spinors are elements 
of X). For each t, ψ (t, x) is an element of  
 
H = L2 (R3; X) = L2 (R3)  X = L2 (R3)  C4. 
 
Other forms of quantum field theory give this type of architecture an even greater complexity. It 
is difficult to overestimate the significance of this architecture, which amounts to a very radical 
view of matter, first manifested in the existence of antimatter. This architecture mathematically 
responds to, and led to a discovery of, the following physical situation, keeping in mind that, as 
quantum mechanics, Dirac’s equation or, more generally, quantum field theory only provides 
probabilities for the outcomes of quantum events, registered in measuring instruments.  
Suppose that one arranges for an emission of an electron, at a given high energy, from a 
source and then performs a measurement at a certain distance from that source. Placing a 
photographic plate at this point would do. The probability of the outcome would be properly 
predicted by quantum electrodynamics. But what will be the outcome? The answer, as we know, 
is not what a classical or even our quantum-mechanical intuition would expect, and this 
unexpected answer was a revolutionary discovery of quantum electrodynamics, beginning with 
Dirac’s equation. To appreciate the revolutionary nature of this discovery, let us consider, first, 
what happens if we deal with a classical object, analogous to an electron, and then a low-energy 
quantum electron in the same type of arrangement. I speak of a classical object because the 
“game of small marbles” for electrons was finished even before quantum mechanics, because an 
electron would be torn apart by the force of its negative electricity. This required theoretical 
physics to treat electron mathematically as a dimensionless point, without really giving it a 
physical concept, as Dirac does not fail to note in his paper, in conjunction with spin, which 
obviously complicated the situation [1, p. 610]. One could still treat an electron classically, for 
example, by the correspondence principle, when an electron is far away from the nucleus. This 
treatment is an idealization because this behavior is quantum, and hence could lead to quantum 
effects described below. On the other hand, within the idealization of classical physics, we may 
treat classical objects (Newton did so already) as dimensionless point endowed with mass. 
We can take as a model of the classical situation a small ball that hits a metal plate, which 
can be considered as either a position or a momentum measurement, or indeed a simultaneous 
measurement of both, and time t. In classical mechanics we can deal directly with the objects 
involved, rather than with their effects upon measuring instruments. The place of the collision 
could, at least in an idealized representation of the situation, be predicted exactly by classical 
mechanics, and we can repeat the experiment with the same outcome on an identical or even the 
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same object. Most importantly, regardless of where we place the plate, we always find the same 
object, at least in an experimental situation shielded from outside interferences, which could 
deflect the ball or even destroy it before it reaches the plate. 
By contrast, if we deal with an electron in the quantum-mechanical regime, beyond the fact 
that it is impossible, because of the uncertainty relations, to predict the place of collision exactly 
or with the degree (in principle unlimited) of approximation possible in classical physics, there is 
a nonzero probability that we will not observe such a collision at all. It is also not possible to 
distinguish two observed traces as belonging to two different objects of the same type, or to 
distinguish such objects in the first place, a circumstance that becomes even more crucial in 
high-energy regimes. Unlike in the classical case, in dealing with quantum objects, there is no 
way to improve the conditions of the experiment to avoid this situation. Quantum mechanics, 
however, gives us correct probabilities for such events. This is accomplished by defining the 
corresponding Hilbert space, with the position and other operators as observables, and using the 
formalism, say, Schrödinger’s equation and Born’s rule for obtaining the statistics of possible 
outcomes, once we repeat the experiment a large number of times. In a single experiment an 
electron could, in principle, be found anywhere, or, again, not found at all. 
Once the process occurs at a high energy and is governed by quantum electrodynamics, the 
situation is still different, indeed radically different. One might find, in the corresponding region, 
not only an electron, as in classical physics, or an electron or nothing, as in the quantum-
mechanical regime, but also other particles: a positron, a photon, an electron–positron pair. Just 
as does quantum mechanics, quantum-electrodynamics, beginning with Dirac’s equation, 
rigorously predicts which among such events can occur, and with what probability, and, in the 
present view it can only predict such probabilities, or statistical correlations between certain 
quantum events. In order to do so, however, the corresponding Hilbert-space machinery becomes 
much more complex, essentially making the wave function ψ a four-component Hilbert-space 
vector, as opposed to a one-component Hilbert-space vector, as in quantum mechanics. This 
Hilbert space is, as noted, H = L2 (R3; X) = L2 (R3) ⊗ X = L2 (R3) ⊗ C4 and the operators are 
defined accordingly. This structure allows for a more complex structure of predictions (which are 
still probabilistic) corresponding to the situation just explained, usually considered in terms of 
virtual particle formation and Feynman’s diagrams. Once we move to still higher energies or 
different domains governed by quantum field theory the panoply of possible outcomes becomes 
much greater. The Hilbert spaces and operator algebras involved would be given a yet more 
complex structure, in relation to the appropriate Lie groups and their representations, defining 
(when these representations are irreducible) different elementary particles, as indicated above 
[37]. In the case of Dirac’s equation we only have electron, positron, and photon. 
It follows that in quantum field theory an investigation of a particular type of quantum object 
irreducibly involves not only other particles of the same type but also other types of particles. 
The identity of particles within each type is strictly maintained in quantum field theory, as it is in 
quantum mechanics. In either theory one cannot distinguish different particles of the same type, 
such as electrons. According to H. Weyl, “the possibility that one of the identical twins Mike and 
Ike is in the quantum state E1 and the other in the quantum state E2 does not include two 
differentiable cases which are permuted on permuting Mike and Ike; it is impossible for either of 
these individuals to retain his identity so that one of them will always be able to say ‘I’m Mike’ 
and the other ‘I’m Ike.’ Even in principle one cannot demand an alibi of an electron!”[40, p. 
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241].15 One cannot be certain that one encounters the same electron in the experiment just 
described even in the quantum-mechanical situation, although the probability that it would be a 
different electron is low. In quantum field theory, it is as if instead of identifiable moving objects 
and motions of the type studied in classical physics, we encounter a continuous emergence and 
disappearance, creation and annihilation, of particles, theoretically governed by the concept of 
virtual particle formation. (This description is still too crude and one needs to supplement it by 
the concept of quantum field, but it will suffice for making my main point here.) The operators 
used to predict the probability of such events are the creation and annihilation operators. 
This view clearly takes us beyond quantum mechanics. For, while the latter questions the 
applicability of classical concepts, such as objects (particles or waves) and motion, at the 
quantum level, it still preserves the identity of quantum objects and of the types of quantum 
objects within the same experiment. It is still possible to speak of this identity, even though, in 
the present view, these objects themselves remain unthinkable and only manifest themselves and 
their identity to each other (the type of their identity, say, electrons vs. photons) in their effects 
upon measuring instruments. This is no longer possible, even within the same experiment, in the 
quantum-field-theoretical regimes, because, as just explained, one may, in the course of the same 
experiment observe different types of particles, which leads to the particle transformation (PT) 
principle. It is a principle because this situation is found and, due to this principle qua principle, 
is to be expected in any regime governed by quantum field theory. This principle was at work, in 
conjunction with or as correlative to various symmetry principles, in the quantum field theory of 
nuclear forces, for example, and governed the practice of theoretical physics, not the least in 
many discoveries of new particles, such as quarks. Indeed, in conjunction with or as correlative 
to various symmetry and invariance principles, but as a more expressly physical one, this 
principle is one of the most crucial principles of high-energy theoretical physics.16 
The emergence of this situation and this principle and this set of principles with Dirac’s 
theory or in the wake of it and as its development was a momentous event in the history of 
quantum physics, comparable to that of Heisenberg’s introduction of his matrix variables, or 
even more momentous, according to Heisenberg. He saw Dirac’s theory as an even more radical 
revolution than quantum mechanics was. In his article, revealingly entitled “What is an 
Elementary Particle?” and devoted to the role of symmetry principles in particle physics, 
Heisenberg spoke of Dirac’s discovery of antimatter as “perhaps the biggest change of all the big 
changes in physics of our century … because it changed our whole picture of matter. … It was 
one of the most spectacular consequences of Dirac’s discovery that the old concept of the 
elementary particle collapsed completely” [43, pp. 31–33].  
A path to a new understanding of the ultimate constitution of nature became open, however. 
Although still unanswered, the question of Heisenberg’s title was advanced, as question, 
immeasurably by Dirac’s equation and then quantum electrodynamics and quantum field theory, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15!The statement is cited in [41], which considers the question of identity and indistinguishability of elementary 
particles (i.e., their indistinguishability from each other within the same particle type, e.g., electrons vs. photons) 
from a realist perspective. See also [42], for a comprehensive realist treatment of the subject. 
16 Although some of these principles are mathematical, they reflect and often express profound physical principles, 
as does, for example, the gauge symmetry principle, found already in Maxwell’s electrodynamics, but especially 
important in general relativity and quantum field theory, as well as in most proposals for quantum gravity. Thus, 
quantum electrodynamics is an abelian gauge theory with the symmetry group U(1) (this group is commutative), and 
it has one gauge field, with the photon being the gauge boson. The Standard Model is a non-abelian gauge theory 
with the symmetry group U(1)×SU(2)×SU(3) and broken symmetries, and it has a total of twelve gauge bosons: the 
photon, three weak bosons, and eight gluons.  
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and was advanced still much further since the time of Heisenberg’s article in the 1970s, reaching 
the so-called Standard Model of particle physics, which is quantum-field-theoretical.17 This 
advancement was essentially guided by the same principles. Following this path, quantum field 
theory made remarkable progress since its introduction or, again, since Heisenberg’s remark, a 
progress resulting in the electroweak unification and the quark model of nuclear forces, 
developments that commenced around the time of these remarks. Many predictions of the theory, 
from quarks to electroweak bosons and the concept of confinement and asymptotic freedom, to 
name just a few, were spectacular, and the field has garnered arguably the greatest number of 
Nobel Prizes in physics. It was also quantum field theory that led to string and then brane 
theories, the current stratosphere and the site of new controversies of theoretical physics. 
This is not to say that the theory is free of difficulties, even apart from it mathematically 
unwieldy and as yet incomplete character (vis-à-vis quantum mechanics within its proper limit). 
The standard model is only partially unified thus far (there is no single symmetry group), 
although achieving such a complete unification is not always seen, including by this author, as 
imperative, insofar as the theories involved predict all the available data in their respective 
domains. The theory’s unwieldiness, although much bemoaned by Dirac, is not necessarily a 
problem either, insofar as it works. What are, then, the problems? Those that led to the necessity 
of renormalization might be. These problems had begun to emerge from the early 1930s, when it 
was realize that the computations provided by quantum electrodynamics were reliable only as a 
first order of perturbation theory and led to the appearance of infinities or divergences in the 
theory once one attempted to make calculations that would provide closer approximations 
matching the experimental data. These difficulties were eventually handled through the 
renormalization procedure, which became and has been ever since a crucial part of the 
machinery of quantum electrodynamics and quantum field theory. In the case of quantum 
electrodynamics, renormalization was performed in the later 1940s by S-I. Tomonaga, J. 
Schwinger, and R. Feynman (which brought them a joint Nobel Prize in 1965), with important 
contributions by others, especially F. Dyson, and earlier H. Bethe and H. Kramers. The Yang-
Mills theory, which grounds the standard model, was eventually shown to be renormalizable by 
M. Veltman and G. ’t Hooft in the 1970s (bringing them their Nobel Prize). This allowed a 
proper development of the Standard Model of all forces of nature, except for gravity, which, 
unlike others, has not been given its quantum form thus far. 
The renormalization procedure is difficult mathematically even in quantum electrodynamics 
(the mathematics of the electro-weak theory or of quantum chromodynamics, which handles the 
strong force, is nearly prohibitively difficult). While it is possible to see renormalization in more 
benign ways (e.g., via the so-called “renormalization group” and “effective quantum field 
theories”) and while it has been very effective thus far, its mathematical legitimacy is still under 
cloud. Roughly speaking, the procedure might be seen as manipulating infinite integrals that are 
divergent and, hence, mathematically illegitimate. At a certain stage of calculation, however, 
these integrals are replaced by finite integrals through artificial cut-offs that have no proper 
mathematical justification within the formalism and are performed by putting in, by hand, 
experimentally obtained numbers that make these integrals finite, which removes the infinities 
from the final results of calculations. These calculations are experimentally confirmed to a very 
high degree. I will not address the details of renormalization further, and will allow myself to 
refer to [45; 46; 47, pp 149-168] and, for a historical account, to [47, pp. 595-605]. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The title was reprised by S. Weinberg’s 1996 article, reflecting on a more advance stage of quantum field theory, 
without, however, answering the question either [44]. 
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discussion of the relevant subsequent developments, such as the renormalization group, effective 
quantum field theories, and so forth is also beyond my scope here, but are considered in [39, 40]. 
Renormalization or other difficulties just mentioned need not mean that quantum field theory 
should be replaced by a different theory, although Dirac thought so throughout his life and he 
wasn’t alone. Luckily, renormalization has worked thus far. Quantum electrodynamics is the best 
experimentally confirmed theory thus far, and many predictions of quantum field theory beyond 
quantum electrodynamics have been spectacular. The discovery of Higgs boson, an essential 
component of the Standard Model, is the latest example, although some of the earlier discoveries, 
such as those of the electroweak (W+, W−, and Z) bosons, the top quark, and the tau-lepton, are 
hardly less significant. The Higgs discovery may still require further confirmation, and the data 
involved may require advancing and perhaps adjusting the Standard Model itself, which is, again, 
not entirely complete in any event [48]. However, the discovery was deemed confirmed enough 
(two independent detectors indicated a likely presence of the Higgs particle) to award the 2013 
Nobel Prize to F. Englert and P. Higgs, who were among those involved in the development of 
the mathematical theory of the Higgs field. Our future fundamental theories might prove to be 
finite (some versions of string and brane theory appear to hold such a promise), thus proving that 
the necessity of renormalization is merely the result of the limited reach of our quantum theories 
at present. (Effective quantum field theories are based on this view.) The emergence of other 
finite alternatives, proceeding along entirely different trajectories, may not be excluded either. 
While, however, a finite theory may be preferable, renormalization may not be a very big price 
to pay for the theory’s extraordinary capacity to predict the increasingly complex manifold of 
quantum phenomena that physics has confronted throughout the history of quantum field theory. 
And then, that a finite theory will not be found cannot be excluded either, in which case 
renormalization will continue to be our main hope.  
The theory does remain incomplete insofar it does not cover the scales beyond the standard 
scale of high-energy physics, where in particular the effects of gravity would need to be taken 
into account. String or brane theory is still the most widely entertained proposal, born from and 
closely and fundamentally related to quantum field theory. The theory is even more complex 
mathematically than quantum field theory and remains highly hypothetical physically, with 
uncertain chances to be connected to experiments in any near future, although certain 
consequences of the theory could eventually be tested. These factors have made the theory 
controversial. While it has many prominent advocates and promoters, and a large (although no 
longer quite as large) cohort of practitioners and adherents, it also has quite a few detractors, 
sometimes to the point of dismissing it as useless and even “dangerous” metaphysics. But then, 
most proposed alternatives, such as, say, loop quantum gravity, are hardly less hypothetical or 
controversial. I shall not enter into these controversies here. Instead, I would like, in closing this 
article to consider a possible alternative approach to high-energy quantum physics, an approach, 
based in quantum information theory, by G. M. D’Ariano and coworkers [9, 10, 11].  
 
5. Principles of Information Processing, Quantum Theory, and Dirac’s Equation 
 
While string or brane theory or most other current proposals for physics beyond quantum field 
theory are constructive theories, D’Ariano and coworkers’ approach to Dirac’s equation is a 
principle one and, as such, is closer to the spirit of Heisenberg’s and Dirac’s work, as considered 
here. It has a constructive dimension as well, introduced by the idea of quantum cellular 
automata (QCA), but this aspect of their framework will not be considered here [9]. In addition, 
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the fact that Dirac’s equation can be derived strictly from “principles of information processing,” 
as embodied in the QCA, without using relativity, suggests, at least to this writer, that the 
ultimate architecture of matter may be quantum. If so, relativity, at least special relativity (but, 
not inconceivably, general relativity as well), is a surface-scale effect of this quantumness, 
although the overall set of principles of information processing in question extends beyond those 
defining this quantumness. Admittedly, the approach is at an early stage, and thus far it only 
offers a derivation of Dirac’s equation, which, however, is a major step in extending quantum 
information theory beyond quantum mechanics. I cannot, within my scope, consider the 
technical aspects of this derivation and also have to bypass several key features of the authors’ 
physical argument, including the role of quantum automata in their framework, developed in 
several articles, to which and further references there I must refer the reader for further details [9, 
10, 11]. I shall only comment on the role of informational principles in these works. I shall 
consider first the authors’ program of finite-dimensional quantum theory based in these 
principles, and then comment on their derivation of Dirac’s equation.18  
The program is inspired in part by “a need for a deeper understanding of quantum theory 
itself from fundamental principles” (which, the authors contend, has never been really achieved) 
and is motivated by the development of quantum information theory, and in part for that reason 
deals with discrete variables and the corresponding (finite-dimensional) Hilbert spaces.19 
According to the authors: “[T]he rise of quantum information science moved the emphasis from 
logics to information processing. The new field clearly showed that the mathematical principles 
of quantum theory imply an enormous amount of information-theoretic consequences. … The 
natural question is whether the implication can be reversed: is it possible to retrieve quantum 
theory from a set of purely informational principles?” [9, p. 1]. In contrast to several preceding 
attempts along quantum-informational lines during the last decade of so, the authors aim to offer 
“a complete derivation of finite-dimensional quantum theory based on purely operational 
informational principles:” 
In this paper we provide a complete derivation of finite dimensional quantum theory based on purely 
operational principles. Our principles do not refer to abstract properties of the mathematical structures that we 
use to represent states, transformations, or measurements, but only to the way in which states, transformations, 
and measurements combine with each other. More specifically, our principles are of informational nature: they 
assert basic properties of information processing, such as the possibility or impossibility to carry out certain 
tasks by manipulating physical systems. In this approach the rules by which information can be processed 
determine the physical theory, in accordance with Wheeler’s program “it from bit,” for which he argued that 
“all things physical are information-theoretic in origin” [51]. Note [however, that] our axiomatization of 
quantum theory is relevant, as a rigorous result, also for those who do not share Wheeler’s ideas on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 “Theory” here refers primarily to the mathematical structure of quantum theory, rather than to its mechanical or 
dynamical aspects, such as, in the case of the finite-dimensional quantum theory, found the quantum mechanics of 
discrete variables (spin). See Note 1 above.  
19 Among the key predecessors here are C. Fuchs’s work, which, however, more recently “mutated” to a somewhat 
different program, that of quantum Bayesianism or QBism (e.g., [49]), and L. Hardy [50], equally motivated by the 
aim of deriving quantum mechanics from a more natural set of principles, postulates, or axioms. Hardy’s paper was, 
arguably, the first rigorous derivation of that type. Neither of these two approaches is constructive or realist, nor, 
again, is that of D’Ariano et al. See [9] for further references. The different terms just mentioned (all of them are use 
by D’Ariano et al as well) do not affect the essential aspects of the programs in question at the moment. All these 
attempts refer to finite-dimensional quantum theories. Let me add that, while emphasizing the role of fundamental 
principles in quantum theory, the present article does not claim that a sufficient understanding of quantum theory 
itself, say, quantum mechanics, from such principles has been achieved. This remains an open question, even more 
so when dealing with continuous variables (to which my discussion has been restricted thus far), where the 
application of the principles of quantum information is more complex as well.  
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informational origin of physics. In particular, in the process of deriving quantum theory we provide alternative 
proofs for many key features of the Hilbert space formalism, such as the spectral decomposition of self-adjoint 
operators or the existence of projections. The interesting feature of these proofs is that they are obtained by 
manipulation of the principles, without assuming Hilbert spaces from the start. [9, p. 1]20 
One of the principles advanced by the authors, the purification principle, plays a particularly, 
indeed uniquely, important role in their program, as an essentially quantum principle: 
The main message of our work is simple: within a standard class of theories of information processing, quantum 
theory is uniquely identified by a single postulate: purification. The purification postulate, introduced in Ref. 
[10], expresses a distinctive feature of quantum theory, namely that the ignorance about a part is always 
compatible with the maximal knowledge of the whole. The key role of this feature was noticed already in 1935 
by Schrödinger in his discussion about entanglement [30], of which he famously wrote “I would not call that 
one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from 
classical lines of thought.” In a sense, our work can be viewed as the concrete realization of Schrödinger’s 
claim: the fact that every physical state can be viewed as the marginal of some pure state of a compound system 
is indeed the key to single out quantum theory within a standard set of possible theories. It is worth stressing, 
however, that the purification principle assumed in this paper includes a requirement that was not explicitly 
mentioned in Schrödinger’s discussion: if two pure states of a composite system AB have the same marginal on 
system A, then they are connected by some reversible transformation on system B. In other words, we assume 
that all purifications of a given mixed state are equivalent under local reversible operations. [9, p. 2] 
The authors also speak of “the purification postulate,” and they refer to the remaining 
informational principles as “axioms,” because “as opposed to the purification ‘postulate,’ … they 
are not at all specific [to] quantum theory” [9, p. 3]. While these terminological distinctions, 
especially the second one, may be somewhat tenuous, they do not affect the authors’ argument. 
These postulates and axioms do define principles in the present sense (and principles often 
involve postulates), and in particular, jointly, provide the guidance for deriving the finite-
dimensional quantum theory. Besides, as will be seen presently, the authors state their strictly 
operational principles later in the article [9, p. 6]. 
The purification principle is a new principle, although it has its genealogy in the previous 
operational approaches mentioned above, which, in particular, equally stress the (axiomatic) 
significance of the tensor product structure. First of all, even beyond the fact that it has a richer 
content than that of Schrödinger’s statement, Schrödinger never saw his claim as a principle, 
perhaps also because of his critical view of quantum mechanics, in agreement with Einstein. The 
principle could be related, along the lines discussed earlier, to Bohr’s RWR principle and his 
concept of completeness, as combined with complementarity, which implies that “the ignorance 
about a part [one of the two complementary parts] is always compatible with the maximal 
knowledge of the whole.” Bohr saw the EPR experiment (the background for Schrödinger’s 
claim and for his concept of entanglement, the term he introduced as well in German 
[Verschränkung] and English) as a manifestation of complementarity, as well as the RWR 
principle [27; 24, v. 2, p. 59].21 The purification principle is, however, given a more rigorous 
mathematical expression (at least in the finite-dimensional case) than one finds in Bohr, whose 
work, as noted above, was not especially concerned with finding mathematical expressions for 
his key principles.  
While having an essential and even unique role in the authors’ operational derivation of the 
finite-dimensional quantum theory, the purification principle is not sufficient to do so. The 
authors need five additional axioms, which I shall state below. This is not surprising. As !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 References inside this and other passages cited from [9], [10] and [11] are adjusted to follow the numbering of 
references in the present article. 
21 J. Bub’s article, cited earlier, also considers quantum mechanics as a principle theory in order to account for the 
EPR-type experiments and quantum entanglement [6]. 
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discussed above, in Heisenberg’s main grounding quantum physical principles—the suspension 
of the description of quantum objects and processes (the proto-RWR principle) and the quantum-
probability (QP) principle—were not sufficient to derive quantum mechanics. To do so, he 
needed the correspondence principle, to which he gave a mathematical form. Dirac, too, needed, 
a larger set of principles, postulates, and assumptions (even apart from those of relativity) for 
deriving his equation than those that define its specifically quantum character, including, again, a 
form of mathematical correspondence principle. What is remarkable, however, that one needs 
only one “postulate” to distinguish classical and quantum information theory. A similar situation 
transpires in Hardy’s paper mentioned above, where indeed this difference turn not only on a 
single “axiom,” but on the use of a single word, “continuity,” technically a single feature of the 
situation, “the continuity of a reversible transformation between any two pure states” [50, p. 2; 
emphasis added].22 It appears, in fact, that this situation reflects the roles of both complex 
numbers and the tensor product, in other words, that of complex Hilbert spaces or their 
mathematical equivalents in quantum theory, roles that appear uncircumventable. 
There are instructive specific parallels (not identical features!) between the authors’ and 
Heisenberg’s approaches, in particular between Heisenberg’s proto-RWR principle and the 
purification principle. The QP principle present in both cases, given that D’Ariano et al (rightly) 
see quantum mechanics an “operational-probabilistic theory” of a special type, defined by the 
purification postulate [9, p. 3]. As they say: “The operational-probabilistic framework combines 
the operational language of circuits with the toolbox of probability theory: on the one hand 
experiments are described by circuits resulting from the connection of physical devices, on the 
other hand each device in the circuit can have classical outcomes and the theory provides the 
probability distribution of outcomes when the devices are connected to form closed circuits (that 
is, circuits that start with a preparation and end with a measurement)” [9, p. 3]. This is close to 
Heisenberg’s and Bohr’s view of the quantum-mechanical situation, keeping in mind the 
difference defined by the concept of “circuit” (not found in either Heisenberg or Bohr), on which 
I shall comment presently. As explained in Section 3, Heisenberg found his formalism by using 
the mathematical correspondence principle, not exactly the first principle, because it depended 
on the equations of classical mechanics at the classical limit where h could be neglected. 
However, Heisenberg needed new variable because the classical variables (as functions of real 
variables) do not give Bohr’s frequencies rules for spectra. Heisenberg discovered that these 
rules are satisfied by, in general, noncommuting matrix variables with complex coefficients, 
related to amplitudes, from which one derives, in essence by means of Born’s rule for this case, 
the probabilities (or probability distributions) for transitions between stationary states (no longer 
assumed to be orbits) defining spectra, which are observed in measuring devices.  
By contrast, D’Ariano et al arrive at the tensor-product architecture in a more first-principle-
like way, in particular, independently of classical physics. (The latter, to begin with, does not 
have discrete variables, such as spin, which are purely quantum, with which the finite-
dimensional quantum theory could be associated.) This is accomplished by using the rules 
governing the structure of operational devices, rules that are more empirical, albeit not 
completely, because they are given a mathematical representation or expression, as they must be, 
in accordance with the authors’ and the present view, or principle. This principle entails the 
necessity of establishing a rigorous mathematical expression for the physical architecture !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 I think, that, in accordance with the definition given at the outset, “postulate” may be a better term, because one 
can hardly have self-evidence of “axioms,” but this is a secondary matter, which, as I said, does not really affect the 
essence of the situation. 
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considered or indeed the fundamental physical principles of quantum theory. As they say: 
“The rules summarized in this section define the operational language of circuits, which has been 
discussed in detail in a series of inspiring works by Coecke” [9, p. 4]. As B. Coecke comments: 
The underlying mathematical foundation of this high-level diagrammatic formalism relies on so-called 
monoidal categories, a product of a fairly recent development in mathematics. Its logical underpinning is linear 
logic, an even more recent product of research in logic and computer science. These monoidal categories do not 
only provide a natural foundation for physical theories, but also for proof theory, logic, programming languages, 
biology, cooking … So the challenge is to discover the necessary additional pieces of structure that allow us to 
predict genuine quantum phenomena. These additional pieces of structure represent the capabilities nature has 
provided us with to manipulate entities subject to the laws of quantum theory. [52, p. 1] 
This may indeed be a more natural way to give the fundamental structures and principles of 
quantum theory a proper mathematical expression. As noted above, the authors need five 
additional axioms for their derivation of the finite-dimensional quantum theory. As they say:  
In addition to the purification postulate, our derivation of quantum theory is based on five informational axioms. 
The reason why we call them “axioms,” as opposed to the purification “postulate,” is that they are not at all 
specific of [to?] quantum theory. These axioms represent standard features of information processing that 
everyone would, more or less implicitly, assume. They define a class of theories of information processing that 
includes, for example, classical information theory, quantum information theory, and quantum theory with 
superselection rules. The question whether there are other theories satisfying our five axioms and, in case of a 
positive answer, the full classification of these theories is currently an open problem. Here we informally 
illustrate the five axioms, leaving the detailed description to the remaining part of the paper: 
(1) Causality: the probability of a measurement outcome at a certain time does not depend on the choice of 
measurements that will be performed later.23 
(2) Perfect distinguishability: if a state is not completely mixed (i.e., if it cannot be obtained as a mixture from 
any other state), then there exists at least one state that can be perfectly distinguished from it. 
(3) Ideal compression: every source of information can be encoded in a suitable physical system in a lossless 
and maximally efficient fashion. Here lossless means that the information can be decoded without errors and 
maximally efficient means that every state of the encoding system represents a state in the information source. 
(4) Local distinguishability: if two states of a composite system are different, then we can distinguish between 
them from the statistics of local measurements on the component systems. 
(5) Pure conditioning: if a pure state of system AB undergoes an atomic measurement on system A, then each 
outcome of the measurement induces a pure state on system B. (Here atomic measurement means a 
measurement that cannot be obtained as a coarse graining of another measurement.) [9, p. 3] 
Importantly, “all these axioms are satisfied by classical information theory” [9, p. 3]. The authors 
also “make precise the usage of the expression ‘operational principle’ in the context of [their] 
paper,” which point should not be missed if one wants to properly understand their 
argumentation, as grounded in fundamental physical (informational) principles:  
By [an] operational principle we mean here a principle that can be stated using only the operational-probablistic 
language, i.e., using only 
(1) the notions of system, test, outcome, probability, state, effect, transformation; 
(2) their specifications: atomic, pure, mixed, completely mixed; and 
(3) more complex notions constructed from the above terms (e.g., the notion of “reversible transformation”). 
The distinction between operational principles and principles referring to abstract mathematical properties, 
mentioned in the Introduction, should now be clear: for example, a statement like “the pure states of a system 
cannot be cloned” is a valid operational principle, because it can be analyzed in basic operational-probabilistic 
terms as ‘for every system A there exists no transformation C with input system A and output system AA such 
that C |φ) = |φ)|φ) for every pure state φ of A.’ On the contrary [By contrast?], a statement like ‘the state space 
of a system with two perfectly distinguishable states is a three-dimensional sphere’ is not a valid operational 
principle, because there is no way to express what it means for a state space to be a three-dimensional sphere in 
terms of basic operational notions. The fact that a state [space] is a sphere may be eventually derived from 
operational principles, but cannot be assumed as a starting point. [9, p. 6] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 As explained earlier (Note 6), this principle is different from that of classical causality (indeed already by virtue 
the principle’s appeal to probability), while being consistent with relativity. 
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This distinction is indeed essential, even though operational principles must be given a proper 
mathematical expression in the formalism of the theory. 
The (principle) way of thinking just outlined is equally central to D’Ariano and Perinotti’s 
derivation of Dirac’s equation, in the framework of quantum cellular automata. To cite the 
authors’ abstract: 
Without using the relativity principle, we show how the Dirac equation in three space dimensions 
emerges from the large-scale dynamics of the minimal nontrivial quantum cellular automaton 
satisfying unitarity, locality, homogeneity, and discrete isotropy. The Dirac equation is recovered for 
small wave-vector and inertial mass, whereas Lorentz covariance is distorted in the ultrarelativistic 
limit. The automaton can thus be regarded as a theory unifying scales from Planck to Fermi. [11, p. 1]  
As I said, I cannot address the concept of cellular quantum automaton, or the technical 
mathematical aspects of this derivation, which cannot be given here the treatment they deserve. 
The two main points that I want to emphasize are as follows. The first is the significance of the 
principles of information processing and of quantum theory, or even of fundamental physics in 
general, and establishing what they are, and indeed developing the understanding of these 
principles. This task is far from being completed, and in some respects it has barely begun to be 
undertaken. The fact, however, that the authors are able to give their principles a proper 
mathematical expression is important, and doing so is a significant accomplishment. The second 
point is, again, that Dirac’s equation could be derived by using principles of information 
processing alone without using the relativity principle. Although this derivation is only a starting 
point as far as high-energy physics, governed by quantum field theory, is concerned, it is clear 
that it has major implications for foundational thinking in fundamental physics, including when it 
comes to large-scale physics. 
As noted above, “the Dirac equation in three space dimensions emerges from the large-scale 
dynamics of the minimum-dimension quantum cellular automaton [QCA], satisfying [linearity], 
unitarity, locality, homogeneity, and discrete isotropy of interactions [without appealing to 
special relativity]. The Dirac equation is recovered for small wave vector and inertial mass, 
whereas Lorentz covariance is generally distorted in the ultrarelativistic limit [of very large 
wave-vectors] [53-56]” [11, p. 1]. This scale is beyond “the usual Fermi scale of high energy 
physics,” because “the QCA as a microscopic mechanism for the emergent quantum field” is 
proposed “as a framework to unify a hypothetical discrete Planck scale with the usual Fermi 
scale of high-energy physics” [11, p. 1; emphasis added]. The hypothetical nature of some of the 
assumptions made and the theories alluded to here must be kept in mind, and I shall return to this 
aspect of the situation presently. 
Dirac’s equation might be seen as an enactment of the mathematical correspondence 
principle applied at a level beyond the Fermi scale.24 This enactment is complex, which should 
not come as a surprise. Recall that even establishing, via Pauli’s spin theory, that establishing 
Schrödinger’s equation as the quantum-mechanical limit of Dirac’s equation was nontrivial. Here 
one deals with a deeper level of, let us say, quantum reality, or possibly a reality beyond the 
quantum, although D’Ariano and Perinotti’s framework suggests, at least to this author, that at 
stake is a certain general quantumness, reflected in linearity and unitarity of their framework at 
the large scale. The key principles of quantum theory and their quantum-theoretical 
mathematical expressions and consequences are clearly at work throughout—Hilbert spaces, 
operators, noncommutativity, the tensor structure, symmetry, group representation, and so forth !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 On the other hand, the article provides “an analytical description of the QCA for the narrow-band states of 
quantum field theory in terms of a dispersive Schrödinger equation holding at all scales” [11, pp. 1, 4]. 
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[11, pp. 2-3]. There is some important new mathematics as well, such as that of “quasi-isometric 
embedding,” a profound recent development in geometry, primarily due to M. Gromov and his 
geometric-group theory [11, p. 3]. The QCA is, then, the quantum cellular automaton operative 
at the large scale. The derivation of Dirac’s equation is achieved by finding Dirac automata, 
which are “obtained by locally coupling Weyl automata” and give the Dirac equation at the 
relativistic limit from the informational principles proposed, all of these principles, rather than 
only linearity and unitarity, which are quantum in character [11, pp. 5, 6-9]. This is a reflection 
of the fact that Dirac’s spinors are composed of Weyl’s spinors. 
In this regard, the situation is parallel to deriving the finite-dimensional quantum theory from 
a larger (than only quantum) set of principles. Locality, homogeneity, and isotropy are additional 
principles here, which allow one to dispense with the principle of relativistic (Lorenz) invariance 
in deriving the equation. Locality merits a special attention here, both in view of its arguably 
primary role in this derivation and in general. The locality requirement itself and the 
corresponding principle are defined by the requirement that the cardinality of the set, Sg, of sites 
g', interacting with the site g (both from a denumerable set G of systems, involved in the cellular 
automaton and described by Fermionic field operators) is “uniformly bound over G, namely, 
€ 
Sg ≤ k < ∞ for every g” [11, p. 2]. This locality requirement or principle is a more general and 
deeper conception than the concept of locality associated with the Lorentz invariance, which 
reemerges from this principle at the corresponding (relativistic) limit and the standard (Fermi) 
scale of quantum field theory, and hence of Dirac’s equation.25 The significance of the locality 
requirement is, however, more general and is critical to the informational QCA framework 
proposed by the authors. In particular, according to D’Ariano (private communication), while 
falsifiability is a crucial (Popperian-like) requirement to be satisfied by this framework, it is 
equally crucial that all falsifiability is local, which may indeed be seen as a fundamental 
principle in its own right.   
The QCA as such is, again, an enactment of large-scale quantum dynamics, the quantum 
character of which is manifest in and is defined by linearity and unitarity. There are significant 
potential implications and benefits of this broader conception beyond the fact the Dirac equation 
is the Fermi-scale limit of the theory: 
The additional bonus of the automaton is that it also represents the canonical solution to practically all issues 
raised by both the continuum and the infinite-volume of the field description, such as all divergencies and the 
problem of particle localizability, all due to the continuum, infinite volume, and the Hamiltonian description. 
Moreover the QCA is the ideal framework for a quantum theory of gravity, being quantum ab initio (the QCA is 
not derivable by quantizing a classical theory), and naturally incorporates the informational foundation for the 
holographic principle, a relevant feature of string theories [57, 58] and the main ingredient of the microscopic 
theories of gravity of Jacobson [59] and Verlinde [60]. Finally, a theory based on a QCA assumes no 
background, but only interacting quantum systems, with space-time and mechanics as emergent phenomena. 
 The assumption of Planck-Scale discreteness has the consequence of breaking Lorentz covariance along with 
all continuous symmetries: These are recovered at the Fermi scale in the same way as in the doubly-special 
relativity of Amelino-Camelia [53, 54], and in the deformed Lorentz symmetry of Smolin and Magueijo [55, 
56]. Such Lorentz deformations have phenomenological consequences, and possible experimental tests have 
been recently proposed by several authors [61-64]. The deformed Lorentz group of the automaton has been 
preliminarily analyzed in Ref. [65]. [11, p. 1] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 This concept has further implications for our understanding of the EPR-type experiments and related problematics, 
as well as for the question of causality, because relativity (both special and general) is a classically causal theory, 
while quantum theory, including as thus extended beyond the Fermi scale, is not. It is only causal relativistically or, 
again, locally in the sense here defined. These subjects would, however, require separate treatments, which cannot 
be undertaken here. 
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It is far beyond my scope to address these aspects of the program and their implications, which 
are exciting and promising but which would also require a careful analysis, including considering 
the works cited here. However, if the potential significance of the proposed program for large-
scale physics is thus made apparent, the hypothetical nature of the theories mentioned here 
should be kept in mind as well. To cite D’Ariano and Perinotti’ conclusion: 
In conclusion, we remark that [the] Lorentz covariance is obeyed only in the relativistic limit |k| ≪ 1, whereas 
the general covariance (corresponding to invariance of !!!±) is a nonlinear deformation of the Lorentz group, 
with additional invariants in the form of energy and distance scales [65], as in the doubly-special relativity [53, 
54] and in the deformed Lorentz symmetry [55, 56], for which the automaton then represents a concrete 
microscopic theory. Correspondingly, also [the] CPT symmetry of Dirac’s QCA is broken in the ultrarelativistic 
scale. [11, p. 9] 
The theories invoked here remain highly hypothetical. Amelino-Camelia and Piran, cited here, 
call a hypothetical suspension of the (Lorentz) relativistic invariance a “drastic assumption,” 
albeit made to address certain puzzling data [54, p. 1]. So, it may pay off to be cautious, even 
though and indeed because alternative proposals, some of which are based on alternative theories 
of cellular automata [e.g., 66], are equally hypothetical.26 However, that Dirac’s equation could 
be derived without using the relativity (Lorentz invariance) principle, in addition to being a 
major achievement in its own right, manifests a promise and potential of the authors’ 
informational program for exploring fundamental physics on scales beyond those of quantum 
field theory. 
Profound foundational questions are at stake. How these questions will be pursued and what 
role the principles of quantum informational will play in it is difficult to predict. The present 
article does not aim to do so. It does suggest, however, that fundamental physical principles may 
play a more significant role than they have more recently in approaching these questions. 
Equally crucially and perhaps more radically, it also suggests, with the help of both Dirac’s own 
and D’Ariano and Perinotti’s derivations of Dirac’s equation, that the fundamental principles of 
quantum physics might prove to be more crucial in this pursuit than those of relativity, not 
inconceivably, general relativity included. In other words, quantum principles may also prove to 
be more crucial rather than those of general relativity in understanding gravity, although, as 
explained above, some form of locality principle may be equally crucial, and homogeneity and 
isotropy are likely to be required as well, as very general principles. In other words, while 
relativity may be abandoned on the large scale (extending to the Planck scale), quantum theory is 
likely to survive, reflecting the ultimately quantum character of nature. If so, and one cannot, 
once again, be certain, we may need yet new quantum principles, possibly conceived on lines of 
principles of information processing and quantum cellular automata, even if developed, as these 
informational principles are, by building on some among the older principles. But then, this may 
be our best way to arrive at new principles in physics or elsewhere. 
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26 For yet another type of alternative approach, see [67]. 
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